



# Organised Crime

# National Situation Report 2019

# Organised Crime 2019



**579 investigative proceedings against OC groups**



## Drug-related crime

More than one third of all OC groups are trafficking in drugs

**202**



## Crime associated with the business world

Especially fraud offences to the detriment of elderly people

**98**



## Property crime

Focus again on motor vehicle-related property offences, theft by breaking and entering continues to decline

**88**



**6.848**  
OC suspects



**73,6 %** Internationally committed offences

Criminal members of ethnically secluded subcultures  
**Clan crime**



**45 OC groups**

Participation of suspected  
**Migrants**  
in organised crime



**505 Suspects**  
(7,4 %)



**803 Mio. €**  
Losses



**644 Mio. €**  
Criminal proceeds



**116 Mio. €**  
Prov. seized assets

The terms "investigation" and "group" are used interchangeably. One OC investigation corresponds to exactly one OC group.

# Table of contents

1	Preliminary remarks.....	5
2	Statistical overview.....	6
3	Presentation and evaluation of the crime situation.....	8
3.1	General data on investigations .....	8
3.2	Financial aspects .....	12
3.2.1	Losses caused by OC groups .....	12
3.2.2	Criminal proceeds generated by OC groups .....	14
3.2.3	Assets provisionally seized by law enforcement authorities.....	15
3.3	Suspects .....	17
3.4	Structures of the OC groups.....	20
3.5	Focal points.....	22
3.5.1	Outlaw motorcycle gangs.....	22
3.5.2	OMCG-type groups.....	24
3.5.3	Italian Organised Crime .....	25
3.5.4	Russian-Eurasian Organised Crime.....	27
3.6	Current manifestations .....	29
3.6.1	Criminal members of ethnically isolated subcultures (clan crime).....	29
3.6.2	Migration and OC .....	36
3.6.3	Suspected links between OC groups and terrorism/politically motivated crime ....	38
3.7	Fields of crime .....	39
4	International aspects of Organised Crime.....	58
5	Overall assessment.....	60
6	Annex .....	62
	Alphabetical overview of all identified nationalities.....	73



# 1 Preliminary remarks


The National Situation Report on Organised Crime for the year 2019 contains current findings on the situation and developments in the field of Organised Crime (OC) in Germany.

On the basis of the working definition of "Organised Crime" developed by the Joint Working Group of the German Police and Judicial Authorities (Gemeinsame Arbeitsgruppe [GAG] Justiz/Polizei) in May 1990, the report is drawn up by the Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt - BKA) in co-operation with the Land Criminal Police Offices (Landeskriminalämter - LKÄ), the Federal Police Headquarters (Bundespolizeipräsidium) and Customs (Zoll).<sup>2</sup> In this context, data on OC investigations conducted during the reporting period are compiled by applying a nationwide uniform set of criteria.

The National Situation Report depicts the results of law enforcement activities of the police in the field of Organised Crime. It represents a description of recorded cases, i.e. crime coming to police notice, but valid assessments of the type and extent of potential unreported crime cases cannot be derived from the basic statistical data.

For the year under review, the Central Customs Authority's unit responsible for investigating illegal work (Finanzkontrolle Schwarzarbeit [Generalzolldirektion-Direktion VII], hereafter abbreviated as FKS) has reported OC investigations for the first time; those are included in this situation report. As a result, a total of 37 OC investigations conducted in the field of crime associated with the business world were reported. This contribution of the FSK led to a significant increase in the number of OC cases.

This year's edition of the National Situation Report on Organised Crime again presents in greater detail the crime committed by members of ethnically isolated subcultures (so-called clan crime) and the involvement of suspected migrants in Organised Crime as well as the links between Organised Crime and terrorism/politically motivated crime.



---

<sup>2</sup> Please note the working definition of "Organised Crime" under 3.1.



## 2 Statistical overview

OC investigations	2019	2018
Number of OC investigations	579 <sup>3</sup>	535
Initial reports	313 (54.1 %)	244 (45.6 %)
Completed investigations	251 (43.4 %)	246 (46.0 %)
Fields of crime	2019	2018
Drug trafficking/smuggling	202 (34.9 %)	201 (37.6 %)
Crime associated with the business world	98 (16.9 %)	55 (10.3 %)
Property crime	88 (15.2 %)	93 (17.4 %)
Illegal immigrant smuggling	60 (10.4 %)	53 (9.9 %)
Tax and customs crime	42 (7.2 %)	39 (7.3 %)
Violent crime	17 (2.9 %)	25 (4.7 %)
Money laundering	15 (2.6 %)	8 (1.5 %)
Counterfeiting/Forgery	12 (2.1 %)	17 (3.2 %)
Criminal organisation	12 (2.1 %)	7 (1.3 %)
Cybercrime	10 (1.7 %)	13 (2.4 %)
Crime associated with nightlife	8 (1.4 %)	16 (3.0 %)
Arms trafficking/smuggling	7 (1.2 %)	4 (0.7 %)
Corruption	4 (0.7 %)	3 (0.5 %)
Environmental crime	1 (0.2 %)	1 (0.2 %)
Other <sup>4</sup>	3 (0.5 %)	- -
International commission of crimes	426 (73.6 %)	418 (78.1 %)
The internet as instrument of crime	45 (7.8 %)	38 (7.1 %)

<sup>3</sup> First-time contribution of the FKS for the year under review in this National Situation Report on Organised Crime (reporting 37 OC groups).

<sup>4</sup> These are three OC investigations conducted in the field of other types of fraud.

<b>Behaviour involving more than one field of crime</b>	<b>194 (33.5 %)</b>	<b>190 (35.5 %)</b>
<b>Average OC potential<sup>5</sup></b>	<b>40.6 points</b>	<b>40.5 points</b>

<b>Suspects</b>	<b>2019</b>	<b>2018</b>
<b>Number of suspects</b>	<b>6,848</b>	<b>6,483</b>
<b>Newly identified suspects</b>	<b>3,268 (47.7 %)</b>	<b>2,998 (46.2 %)</b>
<b>Migrants</b>	<b>505 (7.4 %)</b>	<b>464 (7.2 %)</b>
<b>Number of German suspects</b>	<b>2,282 (33.3 %)</b>	<b>2,023 (31.2 %)</b>
<b>Number of non-German suspects</b>	<b>4,366 (63.8 %)</b>	<b>4,286 (66.1 %)</b>
<b>Turkish nationals</b>	<b>748 (17.1 %)</b>	<b>714 (16.7 %)</b>
<b>Polish nationals</b>	<b>431 (9.9 %)</b>	<b>404 (9.4 %)</b>
<b>Number of suspects whose nationality is unclear, not specified, stateless suspects</b>	<b>200 (2.9 %)</b>	<b>174 (2.7 %)</b>
<b>Total number of nationalities</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>90</b>
<b>Number of armed suspects</b>	<b>355 (5.2 %)</b>	<b>373 (5.8 %)</b>
<b>Perpetrator structures</b>	<b>2019</b>	<b>2018</b>
<b>Number of OC investigations featuring heterogeneous perpetrator structures<sup>6</sup></b>	<b>424 (73.2 %)</b>	<b>401 (75.0 %)</b>
<b>Number of OC investigations featuring homogeneous perpetrator structures<sup>7</sup></b>	<b>155 (26.8 %)</b>	<b>134 (25.0 %)</b>

<b>Financial aspects</b>	<b>2019</b>	<b>2018</b>
<b>Losses</b>	<b>EUR 803 million</b>	<b>EUR 691 million</b>
<b>Identified criminal proceeds</b>	<b>EUR 644 million</b>	<b>EUR 675 million</b>
<b>Provisionally seized assets</b>	<b>EUR 116 million</b>	<b>EUR 72 million</b>
<b>Number of OC investigations resulting in the provisional seizure of assets</b>	<b>170 (29.4 %)</b>	<b>172 (32.2 %)</b>
<b>Number of OC investigations involving money laundering activities</b>	<b>234 (40.4 %)</b>	<b>211 (39.4 %)</b>

<sup>5</sup> Please see page 20 for explanations on the OC potential.

<sup>6</sup> OC groups whose suspects are of different nationalities.


<sup>7</sup> OC groups whose suspects are of the same nationality.

# 3 Presentation and evaluation of the crime situation

## 3.1 GENERAL DATA ON INVESTIGATIONS

The total number of investigations into OC groups shows that OC continues to show an unchanged high damage and threat potential in Germany. In contrast to the last year under review, the total number of investigations increased from 535 to 579 (+8.2%) in 2019. The sharp increase in the number of OC investigations compared to the previous year is due to the first-time participation of the customs units of the FKS in the survey, which reported 37 OC investigations. If the first-time participation of the FKS for 2019 were not taken into account statistically, there would still be an increase of seven OC investigations compared to the previous year.

### Development of the number of investigations into OC groups (2010 - 2019)



The development of the number of OC investigations varies between the 16 Land Criminal Police Offices and the federal authorities (Bundeskriminalamt / Federal Criminal Police Office, Bundespolizei / Federal Police, Zoll / Customs).




The investigations conducted by the federal authorities were allocated to the Länder according to the location of the public prosecutor's office leading the respective investigations (previous year's figures in brackets).

Land (federal state)	Land level	Federal level	Fed. Crim. Pol. Off.	Fed. Pol.	Customs	Total	
North Rhine-Westphalia	73	40	2	8	30	113	(107)
Bavaria	60	17	3	8	6	77	(78)
Lower Saxony	52	12	0	2	10	64	(58)
Berlin	44	12	2	4	6	56	(59)
Baden-Württemberg	36	6	0	2	4	42	(42)
Hesse	27	24	2	7	15	51	(39)
Hamburg	24	15	2	3	10	39	(27)
Schleswig-Holstein	18	12	0	4	8	30	(22)
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania <sup>8</sup>	18	6	0	4	2	24	(17)
Rhineland-Palatinate <sup>9</sup>	17	4	0	2	2	21	(18)
Saxony	14	6	0	3	3	20	(24)
Brandenburg	9	3	0	0	3	12	(10)
Saarland	9	1	0	0	1	10	(12)
Saxony-Anhalt	6	3	0	0	3	9	(14)
Thuringia	5	2	0	2	0	7	(4)
Bremen	1	3	1	2	0	4	(4)
<b>Total</b>	<b>413</b>	<b>166</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>579</b>	
Previous year	(402)	(133)	(20)	(48)	(65)		(535)

<sup>8</sup> One investigation from Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania was conducted by a public prosecutor's office in Hesse.

<sup>9</sup> Two investigations from Rhineland-Palatinate were conducted by public prosecutor's offices in Hesse.

**Breakdown of investigations by Land (Land police forces + investigations conducted by federal authorities)<sup>10</sup>**



<sup>10</sup> Total of the OC investigations conducted by Land police forces and the OC investigations conducted by federal authorities.

All general characteristics and at least one of the specific characteristics listed under alternatives a) to c) of the OC definition (see below for explanation) must be met for criminal behaviour to qualify as Organised Crime. The distribution of the specific characteristics given in the OC definition was as follows in the year under review (multiple recordings possible):

- 545 investigations: alternative a)
- 227 investigations: alternative b)
- 100 investigations: alternative c)

In a total of 48 investigations, all three specific characteristics were identified.

The figures presented here essentially correspond to the developments seen during the past years. Only alternative a) is subject to a significant increase. However, this can be explained by the first-time reporting of the 37 OC investigations by the FKS units, which have in all cases indicated alternative a). In contrast, alternative b) shows a slight decrease compared to the previous year (2018: 238 investigations).



### **Working definition of "Organised Crime"**



*"Organised Crime is the planned, profit or power-driven commission of criminal offences which - individually or as a whole - are of considerable importance where more than two persons collaborate on a division-of-tasks basis for a prolonged or indefinite period of time*

- a) by using commercial or business-like structures,*
- b) by using violence or other means of intimidation or*
- c) by exerting influence on politics, the media, the public administration, the judiciary or the business sector."*

*The working definition of "Organised Crime", which was adopted by the Joint Working Group of the German Police and Judicial Authorities (GAG Justiz/Polizei) in May 1990, serves as the basis for collecting data for the National Situation Report on Organised Crime.*

## 3.2 FINANCIAL ASPECTS



In about 90 % of the cases (519 out of 579 OC groups), financial investigations were conducted in addition to offence-specific investigations in order to shed light on the financial situation of the suspects and to identify criminally obtained assets. Moreover, in about 40 % of the cases (234 out of 579 OC groups), concealment activities regarding the origin of the criminally obtained assets (money laundering activities) were detected.

### 3.2.1 Losses caused by OC groups

#### Loss



1. *The loss generally corresponds to the monetary value (market value) of the illegally obtained property. In the case of property offences, the loss should be understood as the decrease in the asset's value.*
2. *The values given here are direct losses without consideration of any follow-up costs. This means that losses in the field of OC are recorded according to the same systematic approach used for the police crime statistics (PKS).*
3. *Please note that in the case of drug deals (which more than one third of all OC groups engage in) losses are generally not recorded as they are per se illegal and thus there can be no monetary loss. This also applies to certain forms of cybercrime, counterfeiting/forgery, crime associated with nightlife, violent crime, environmental and weapons crime.*

The total loss recorded for the year 2019 amounted to around EUR 803 million (2018: EUR 691 million).


The increase of the total loss compared to the previous year is mainly due to newly reported losses resulting from crime associated with the business world and tax/customs offences. Experience shows that the two offences mentioned above cause the greatest losses.

The annual - in some cases very large - fluctuations in the total amount are due to the fact that losses identified in an investigation - even if it is conducted over several years - are statistically recorded only in the reporting year in which they were caused. In those years under review, in which the respective investigations are continued, the losses are not recorded again.

The 579 investigations mentioned in the National Situation Report on Organised Crime represent all crimes reported and known to the police in connection with activities by OC groups in Germany. Consequently, the total loss of EUR 803 million ascertained in 2019 cannot be regarded as a final figure for the actual threat and damage potential arising from OC groups operating in Germany.

The highest loss identified in a single OC investigation in 2019 was EUR 350 million. It was the result of an investigation conducted in the field of crime associated with the business world (illegal financial services) and corresponds to 43.6 % of the total losses ascertained. This illustrates that even individual OC investigations can have a major influence on the development of the total loss as well as the annual, sometimes strong fluctuations.

## Development of the losses identified



## Breakdown of losses identified by field of crime (excerpt)

	Fields of crime	2019	2018
1	Crime associated with the business world	EUR 552.4 million (68.8 %)	EUR 136.4 million (19.7 %)
2	Tax and customs crime	EUR 161.9 million (20.2 %)	EUR 410.5 million (59.4 %)
3	Property crime	EUR 47.0 million (5.9 %)	EUR 128.1 million (18.5 %)

### 3.2.2 Criminal proceeds generated by OC groups

In the context of financial investigations conducted in 2019, criminal proceeds amounting to roughly EUR 644 million were traced back to 234 (2018: 207) out of 579 OC groups.

The most profitable fields of crime for OC groups were crime associated with the business world with criminal proceeds of roughly EUR 406 million and tax/customs offences with criminal proceeds of roughly EUR 106 million. These fields of crime were followed by drug trafficking/smuggling, property crime and illegal immigrant smuggling.

The highest criminal proceeds identified in a single OC investigation amounted to around EUR 250 million. It was the result of an investigation conducted in the field of crime associated with the business world (illegal financial services). This investigation also accounted for the highest loss identified in 2019.

#### **Criminal proceeds**



*Criminal proceeds are assets which were obtained by the perpetrator, participants in the offence or a third party from or for the offence, or which were identified as instruments of crime. The calculation is based on the gross principle, i.e. all proceeds, which a perpetrator has obtained from an offence, are taken into account without deducting any previous investments or costs incurred.*

#### **Breakdown of criminal proceeds by field of crime (excerpt)**

	Fields of crime	2019	2018
1	<b>Crime associated with the business world</b>	<b>EUR 405.9 million (63.0 %)</b>	EUR 60.0 million (8.9 %)
2	<b>Tax and customs crime</b>	<b>EUR 106.0 million (16.4 %)</b>	EUR 248.4 million (36.8 %)
3	<b>Drug trafficking/smuggling</b>	<b>EUR 46.4 million (7.2 %)</b>	EUR 256.0 million (37.9 %)




### 3.2.3 Assets provisionally seized by law enforcement authorities

During the year under review, the authorities provisionally seized assets amounting to around EUR 116 million in the context of 170 investigations targeting OC groups (2018: approximately EUR 72 million in 172 investigations).<sup>11</sup>

The highest amount of money seized in a single OC investigation targeting an OC group in 2019 amounted to about EUR 26 million. It was also the result of the same investigation conducted in the field of crime associated with the business world (illegal financial services), which also accounted for the highest loss identified and the highest proceeds in 2019.

#### Total amount of provisionally seized assets and identified criminal proceeds



During the period under review, the share of provisionally seized assets in the criminally obtained proceeds was 18.1 % (2018: 10.7 %). The significantly increased but still low share compared to the previous year continues to suggest that the police find it very difficult to uncover the concealment measures carried out by OC groups regarding their illicit assets as well. In addition, newly reported OC investigations are often at a stage where - as the case may be - proof has already been found for a loss caused or for the illegal origin of funds but where no assets have been confiscated yet or no seizable assets have been identified yet.

#### **Provisional seizure of assets**

*The provisional seizure of assets represents a legal procedure where assets generated by criminal conduct are provisionally seized by the authorities in favour of forfeiture or confiscation claims of the authorities or claims asserted under civil law by aggrieved parties. The provisional seizure is maintained until a final decision is taken in the context of court proceedings as to whether civil claims of aggrieved parties will be satisfied, whether the assets are subject to forfeiture or confiscation or whether they have to be released again.*



<sup>11</sup>The here, too, - in some cases - high fluctuations of the total amounts of proceeds and seized assets compared to previous years can be explained in the same way as the fluctuations of the losses.

### Breakdown of provisional seizures of assets by field of crime (excerpt)

	Fields of crime	2019	2018
1	Crime associated with the business world	EUR 46.8 million (40.2 %)	EUR 26.8 million (37.1 %)
2	Money laundering	EUR 25.6 million (22.10 %)	EUR 1.8 million (2.4 %)
3	Cybercrime	EUR 16.2 million (13.9 %)	EUR 0.01 million (0.01 %)




### 3.3 SUSPECTS



In the 2019 reporting period, the number of suspects did not continue the downward trend of previous years but rose again by 5.6 % to a total of 6,848 suspects. Here, too, it must be taken into account that the increase is partly due to the 37 OC investigations with a total of 181 suspects that the FKS reported for the first time in the year under review.

During the year under review, German nationals continued to make up the majority of all OC suspects with 2,282 suspects and a share of 33.3 % (2018: 2,023 suspects, 31.2 %). A total of 10.7 % of the German suspects (245) had a different nationality at birth, including Turkish (60), Russian (49), Kazakh (18), Iranian (13) and Afghan (11).

#### Development of the number of suspects



Among the 4,566 non-German OC suspects, Turkish nationals dominated in the year under review with 748 OC suspects (2018: 714). The share in the total number of suspects amounts to 10.9 % (2018: 11.0 %). They are followed by Polish nationals with 6.3 % (2018: 6.2 %), Italian nationals with 3.6 % (2018: 3.2 %) and Albanian nationals with 3.6 % (2018: 3.8 %). The nationality of 2.9 % of all suspects remained unclear (2018: 2.5 %).<sup>12</sup>


A total of 5.2 % of the OC suspects identified (355) were proved to have been armed.

The following chart is an extract from the list of suspects reported in the year under review.

A list of all identified suspects is included in the annex.

<sup>12</sup> Stateless persons are also subsumed under the category of unclear nationalities.


## Number of suspects by nationality (excerpt)



## Suspects newly identified during the year under review

With a share of 37.3 % (2018: 32.1 %), German nationals account for a significantly higher proportion of newly identified suspects and continue to represent the largest share of these. The share of newly recorded Turkish nationals, however, decreased to 11.5 % (2018: 13.3 %) - they rank second again though. Albanian nationals follow in third place with 4.5 % (2018: 3.5 %); their share in the number of suspects, who were recorded for the first time, increased.


Newly identified Albanian (+39 %), Romanian and Syrian (+32.8 % each) as well as Polish (-48.6 %) suspects are subject to the highest percentage changes compared to the previous year.



The nationality of 4.3 % of all newly identified suspects (2018: 2.0 %) has not yet been clarified.

The following chart shows an excerpt of the newly identified suspects by nationality reported in the year under review. A list of all newly identified suspects can be found in the alphabetical overview in the annex.

#### Number of newly identified suspects by nationality (excerpt)



### 3.4 STRUCTURES OF THE OC GROUPS


In about two thirds of the OC groups identified, the groups consisted of up to ten suspects (67.4 %; 2018: 65.8 %). In 30.1 % of the OC investigations, eleven to 50 suspects (2018: 32.0 %) were recorded and, in 2.6 % of the OC investigations, more than 50 suspects (2018: 1.5 %) were recorded. The smallest group of perpetrators consisted of three members (2018: 3); the largest group of perpetrators had 142 members (2018: 135). The following chart is an excerpt of the dominating nationalities recorded in the year under review and, in addition to the groups dominated by German nationals, shows the ranking of the ten most frequently represented groups dominated by other nationalities. More information on the nationalities mentioned here as well as an alphabetical breakdown of all the groups identified can be found in the annex.

#### ***Dominating nationalities***



*In order to determine the dominating nationality of an OC group, the nationalities of the persons holding a leading position within the OC group are decisive. This does not necessarily mean that the majority within a group have to have this nationality.*

**Number of groups by dominating nationality (excerpt)**




All reported OC investigations were checked for their OC relevance. In addition, the OC groups were qualitatively assessed in terms of their degree of organisation and professionalisation (so-called OC potential). The OC potential is calculated by counting and weighting the respective applicable indicators from the list of "General indicators for identifying OC-relevant cases".

With this method, the different stages of a crime - i.e. preparation and planning of the offence, commission of the offence and use of the proceeds - are evaluated. In relation to 2018, the average OC potential remained almost stable (40.6 points compared to 40.5 points in the previous year). Groups with a medium OC potential (between 30 and 60 points) made up the largest share. As in the previous year, there were still few groups with either a very low or very high OC potential.



In addition, OC groups are divided into homogeneous or heterogeneous group structures. A homogeneous group is defined as one whose members have only one nationality.

In the year 2019, 155 OC groups had a homogeneous structure (2018: 134) and, consequently, 424 OC groups (2018: 401) had a heterogeneous structure.



## 3.5 FOCAL POINTS

The findings from investigations and analyses of OC groups illustrate that their members join forces for various reasons. One of the motives may be things the individuals have in common (e.g. the same socio-cultural or linguistic background). In the following, OC groups which show such similarities within their structures and are of relevance for criminal investigations are looked into.



### 3.5.1 Outlaw motorcycle gangs

In 2019, 15 OC investigations (2.6 % of all OC groups; 2018: 12) targeted OMCG<sup>13</sup> members (211 suspects; 2018: 166). Compared to the previous year, this represents an increase of 25.0 % in the number of such investigations<sup>14</sup>.

Seven of the 15 OC investigations into OMCG members were conducted on suspicion of violent crime (homicide, extortion and bodily injury offences) and six on suspicion of drug trafficking/smuggling (cannabis, cocaine and synthetic drugs).

Two thirds of the OMCG groups were dominated by German nationals (10), four of the groups by Turkish nationals and one by Polish nationals.

#### **Outlaw motorcycle gangs**



In Germany, there are about 700 chapters/charters with about 10,000 members of outlaw motorcycle gangs. *These include local associations of the internationally known outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMCG) Bandidos MC (BMC), Gremium MC (GMC) and Hells Angels MC (HAMC) as well as their support clubs.*

*There are also motorcycle clubs which, for the most part, only operate regionally. Crime committed by members of these groups ranges from drug offences and violent crime to crime associated with nightlife or the business world.*

#### **Hells Angels MC**

In 2019, seven OC investigations (2018: 7) were directed against a total of 94 members of the Hells Angels MC. As in 2018 already, three of the OC investigations were dominated by German and Turkish and one by Polish suspects.

In four cases, the OC investigations against the Hells Angels MC were conducted on suspicion of drug trafficking/smuggling and, in three cases, in the field of violent crime.

Most of the 94 Hells Angels MC members were German nationals (53 suspects) or Turkish nationals (29 suspects).

<sup>13</sup> Please see the yellow info box for the definition.

<sup>14</sup> Multiple recordings are possible as some of the individual OC investigations targeted several groups.

## **Bandidos MC**

Five OC investigations (2018: 2) were conducted against a total of 62 suspects belonging to the Bandidos MC. In this context, four OC investigations were dominated by German nationals and one by Turkish nationals.

Two of each of the five OC investigations were conducted in the fields of crime of drug trafficking/smuggling and violent crime. One OC group was active in the field of counterfeiting (cash).

The majority the 62 Bandidos MC members were German nationals (56 suspects).

## **Further OMCG groups**

Three OC investigations were conducted against members of other MCs (2018: 3) - one OC investigation each dominated by German suspects against a total of 55 persons (54 German and one Czech suspect) who are members of the Gremium MC, Freeway Riders MC and Red Devils MC.

In addition, links to members of outlaw motorcycle gangs were identified in 32 OC investigations (2018: 36).<sup>15</sup>

---

<sup>15</sup> Multiple recordings are possible as some of the individual OC investigations targeted several groups.

### 3.5.2 OMCG-type groups

The number of OC investigations conducted against members of OMCG-type groups (93 members under suspicion) dropped to a total of six (2018: 9).

The six OC investigations were conducted exclusively for violent offences (4) and suspected drug trafficking/smuggling (2). Three of the OMCG-type groups were dominated by German nationals, two of the groups by Turkish nationals and one group by Iraqi nationals.

Furthermore, ten investigations (2018: 6) targeted OC groups with links to members of OMCG-type groups.

#### **OMCG-type groups**



*Compared to outlaw motorcycle gangs, OMCG-type groups have a similar hierarchical structure, the same self-image, and they demonstrate their shared identity to the outside world through clothing or symbols. They are also active in the same fields of crime. The difference to outlaw motorcycle gangs is that there is no obligation for members to have a motorcycle. Motorcycles only play a minor role. Due to the short lifespan of many of these associations and the often high fluctuation of members, the numbers of existing clubs and associated members are subject to a very dynamic development.*

#### **United Tribuns**

In 2019, three OC investigations (2018: 4) were conducted against members of the United Tribuns.

In this context, two of the OC investigations were dominated by German and one by Turkish suspects.

Two OC investigations against the United Tribuns were conducted in the field of violent crime and one group was investigated on suspicion of drug trafficking/smuggling.

Among the 33 members of the United Tribuns investigated as suspects, German and Turkish nationals were most strongly represented with 12 and ten suspects, respectively.

#### **Further OMCG-type groups**

In three OC investigations against a total of 50 members of various other OMCG-like groups investigated as suspects, two cases were investigated on suspicion of drug trafficking/smuggling and one case on suspicion of violent crime. The three OC groups were dominated by German, Iraqi and Turkish nationals. Most of the suspects (25 persons) were German nationals.

### 3.5.3 Italian Organised Crime

In the year under review, 15 OC investigations (2018: 13) were directed against members of Italian mafia groups.

These groups were mainly active in the field of drug trafficking/smuggling, in particular of cocaine. Italian Organised Crime (IOC) groups were also active in the fields of money laundering and motor vehicle-related property offences. Altogether 269 suspects were reported in these OC investigations, 161 of them being Italian nationals. The remaining suspects had different nationalities.

In total, four of the other OC groups identified in Germany in 2019 had links to members of the Italian mafia groups 'Ndrangheta, Camorra and Cosa Nostra (2018: 4). Three investigations conducted against IOC groups revealed links to other IOC groups.

In 2019, a total of 19 OC investigations were dominated by Italian nationals, of which 14 investigations are attributed to IOC groups. In three other OC investigations, links to Italian mafia groups were identified.

Two OC investigations were conducted against groups who could not be clearly attributed to a specific IOC group at the time of recording.

#### **'Ndrangheta**

In 2019, ten OC investigations (2018: 9) against a total of 179 members of the 'Ndrangheta were recorded. The groups that were the subject of the investigations were all dominated by Italian nationals.

The investigations targeting the members of the 'Ndrangheta focused on drug trafficking/smuggling (four investigations); three investigations were conducted on suspicion of forming a criminal organisation, two on suspicion of money laundering and one in the field of property crime (motor vehicle-related property offences).

#### **Cosa Nostra**

In the year under review, law enforcement authorities conducted two OC investigations (2018: 1) against 44 members of the Cosa Nostra. Both OC groups were dominated by Italian nationals.

One OC investigation each was conducted on suspicion of formation of a criminal organisation as well as in the field of drug trafficking/smuggling.

#### **Camorra**

In 2019, one OC investigation (2018: 2) was conducted against 16 members of the Camorra. The OC group, which was dominated by German nationals, was active in the field of drug trafficking/smuggling.

## Territories of the IOC groups in their country of origin Italy





### 3.5.4 Russian-Eurasian Organised Crime

The unifying element of Russian-Eurasian Organised Crime (REOC), apart from a common cultural background, is the Russian language. Hence, all OC structures are taken into consideration which

- are dominated by persons who were born in one of the post-Soviet states and have experienced cultural and social ideals of isolation, strength and determination in the context of crime, or
- are dominated by persons who were born outside a post-Soviet state but who, because of their culture, history, language, traditions or ancestors, feel committed and dedicated to the above-mentioned ideals.

In Germany, these include in particular ethnic German resettlers, who fill these ideals with life in OC groups.

#### Post-Soviet states



- Armenia
- Azerbaijan
- Belarus
- Estonia
- Georgia
- Kazakhstan
- Kyrgyzstan
- Latvia
- Lithuania
- Republic of Moldova
- Russian Federation
- Tajikistan
- Turkmenistan
- Ukraine
- Uzbekistan

The most essential ideology is that of criminal authorities traditionally referred to as "thieves in law". "Thieves in law" are guided by their own system of norms and values and are committed to their own code. The syndicates that emerged from the local gangs of post-Soviet Russia in the 1990s are closely associated with this ideology. The REOC phenomenon comprises all criminal and related legal and illegal economic activities undertaken in accordance with this code. A central element is the so-called thieves' fund ("obshchak"), into which all members or levels of the strictly hierarchically structured and internally as well as externally isolated organisations must pay.

In 2019, 27 investigations (2018: 26) were conducted against groups attributed to REOC (4.7 % of all OC investigations). In 21 investigations, the suspects acted at the international level, in the others at the regional and national level.

**Number of REOC investigations by dominant nationality**




Ten REOC groups were dominated by Russian nationals, four by German, three by Armenian and two by Georgian nationals.

Furthermore, 72 German, 60 Lithuanian and 49 Russian suspects were recorded among others in all REOC investigations. The German suspects are mostly persons born outside a post-Soviet state who consider themselves members of an ethnic group from one of the post-Soviet states, however.

The REOC groups were mainly active in the following fields of crime: crime associated with the business world, property crime or drug trafficking/smuggling.

#### Fields of crime of the REOC groups



In 2019, six investigations were conducted against OC groups dominated by Russian nationals, who can be attributed to the Chechen ethnic group. Four of the investigations were conducted - amongst other - on suspicion of violent crime or extortion.

Chechen criminal groups showed an above-average propensity to escalate and resort to violence; in three investigations, they also came to notice for attempted and completed homicides.

In addition, four investigations were conducted in 2019 against REOC groups featuring links to other REOC groups (2018: 7).

#### Ethnic Chechens

*When the National Situation Report on Organised Crime is prepared, the investigating services have the option to indicate an ethnic origin in addition to the nationality. This also applies to the Chechen ethnicity which is recorded inter alia for the Russian nationality.*



#### Map of the post-Soviet states



## 3.6 CURRENT MANIFESTATIONS

Since 2018, in the context of the data collection for the National Situation Report on Organised Crime, data on more recent manifestations of OC, such as crime committed by members of ethnically isolated subcultures (so-called clan crime), as well as data on the possible effects of migration on OC have been collected in a targeted manner. In addition, the data are analysed for presumed links of OC groups to terrorism/extremism or politically motivated crime.

### 3.6.1 Criminal members of ethnically isolated subcultures (clan crime)



The year under review is the second year in which the phenomenon of criminal members of ethnically isolated subcultures (so-called clan crime<sup>16</sup>) is examined in detail in the National Situation Report on Organised Crime. To date, there has been no nationwide binding definition of the term "clan crime". The following statements on clan crime in the context of Organised Crime are based on the classification criteria and indicators for clan crime established by the federal and Länder authorities. The approaches to defining clan crime, which already exist in individual Länder, remain unaffected by these classification criteria and indicators.

#### **Classification criteria and indicators for clan crime in connection with Organised Crime\***



*Clan crime refers to crimes committed by members of ethnically isolated subcultures. It is characterised by family ties, a common ethnic origin and a high degree of isolation of the perpetrators, which facilitates the commission of crimes or makes it more difficult to detect crimes. This is accompanied by an own set of values and the general rejection of the German legal system. In this context, clan crime can feature one or several of the following indicators:*

- *a strong orientation towards the mostly patriarchal-hierarchical family structure*
- *a lack of willingness to integrate with aspects of a territorial concentration,*
- *the provocation of escalations even in the case of non-significant occasions or minor legal infringements,*
- *the exploitation of group-immanent mobilisation and threat potentials,*
- *an apparent degree of propensity for violence.*

*\* These classification criteria and indicators are used in the OC National Situation Report whenever the OC definition applies.*

#### **Clan crime - general overview for the year 2019**

The classification criteria and indicators make it possible to apply the term "clan crime" to a broad spectrum of OC groups of different origins. For this reason, an overview of the key figures of clan crime, which takes into account all manifestations of this phenomenon, is given first.

<sup>16</sup> For the sake of readability, the term "clan crime" is used in the following.

In 2019, federal and Länder authorities conducted 45 OC investigations (2018: 45) that were attributed to clan crime, which corresponds to a share of 7.8 % (2018: 8.4 %) of all OC investigations recorded in the year under review. In this context, the OC investigations conducted in connection with clan crime were directed against

- 20 OC groups of the Mhallami<sup>17</sup> (2018: not specified),
- 14 OC groups of Arab<sup>18</sup> origin (2018: 24),
- 4 OC groups stemming from Turkey<sup>19</sup> (2018: 3),
- 2 OC groups originating from Western Balkan countries<sup>20</sup> (2018: 8),
- 1 OC group originating from Maghreb countries<sup>21</sup> (2018: 1) and
- 4 OC groups of other origins (2018: 9).

Over two thirds of all OC investigations conducted in connection with clan crime were conducted in those Länder where criminal structures of clan crime have established themselves, in particular: North Rhine-Westphalia (19 OC investigations), Berlin (7), Lower Saxony (5) and Bremen (1). The distribution of all clan crime OC investigations is listed in the following table.

---

<sup>17</sup> Following a decision by the Organised Crime Commission (Kommission Organisierte Kriminalität), the category "Mhallami" was newly included in the OC National Situation Report for the year under review as it represents - amongst others - a further phenomenological distinction from other forms of clan crime (e.g. clan crime in the Western Balkans or Maghreb countries). A comparison with the previous year is thus not possible.

<sup>18</sup> OC suspects of clan crimes of Arab origin are persons who have the nationality of a state of the Arab League (excluding the Maghreb countries): Egypt, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Yemen.

<sup>19</sup> The term "stemming from Turkey" is used to distinguish between regional (here: Turkish territory) and ethnic origin. The term refers to persons who do not have Turkish citizenship but who come from Turkey according to their origin.

<sup>20</sup> The Western Balkans include the countries Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia.

<sup>21</sup> The Maghreb countries include Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.

**Breakdown of OC investigations in connection with clan crime by Länder and federal authorities**  
(figures for the previous year in brackets)

	Mhallami	Arab origin	Stemming from Turkey	Western Balkans	Maghreb countries	Others	Σ
<b>Berlin</b>	0	6	0	0	0	1	7 (5)
<b>Baden-Württemberg</b>	0	1	0	0	0	0	1 (3)
<b>Bremen</b>	1	0	0	0	0	0	1 (1)
<b>Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania</b>	1	0	0	0	0	0	1 (0)
<b>Lower Saxony</b>	2	2	1	0	0	0	5 (3)
<b>North Rhine-Westphalia</b>	15	0	2	1	0	1	19 (21)
<b>Rhineland-Palatinate</b>	0	0	0	0	0	1	1 (0)
<b>Saarland</b>	0	0	0	1	0	1	2 (3)
<b>Schleswig-Holstein</b>	1	0	0	0	0	0	1 (0)
<b>BJA</b>	0	0	1 <sup>22</sup>	0	0	0	1 (0)
<b>Federal Police</b>	0	3 <sup>23</sup>	0	0	0	0	3 (1)
<b>Customs</b>	0	2 <sup>24</sup>	0	0	1 <sup>25</sup>	0	3 (3)
<b>Σ</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>45 (40)</b>

The OC groups attributed to clan crime are mainly dominated by persons of German, Lebanese, Turkish or Syrian nationality. This is due to the high share of such OC investigations, which can be subsumed under the categories "Mhallami", "of Arab origin" and "stemming from Turkey". In the OC groups, in which German nationals take the leading role, the suspects have a corresponding

<sup>22</sup> The OC investigation conducted by the BKA is pending with a public prosecutor's office in Bremen.

<sup>23</sup> The three OC investigations conducted by the Federal Police are pending with public prosecutor's offices in Bavaria, North Rhine-Westphalia and Rhineland-Palatinate.

<sup>24</sup> The two OC investigations conducted by the customs authorities are pending with public prosecutor's offices in North Rhine-Westphalia.

<sup>25</sup> The OC investigation conducted by the customs authorities is pending with a public prosecutor's office in Lower Saxony.

ethnic origin. According to the classification criteria and indicators, these persons represent their own set of values and/or reject the German legal system.

#### **Dominating nationalities of the OC groups attributed to clan crime**


<b>Nationality</b>	<b>2019</b>	<b>2018</b>
<b>German</b>	<b>12 (26.7 %)</b>	<b>8 (17.8 %)</b>
<b>Lebanese</b>	<b>9 (20.0 %)</b>	<b>11 (24.4 %)</b>
<b>Turkish</b>	<b>7 (15.6 %)</b>	<b>4 (8.9 %)</b>
<b>Syrian</b>	<b>6 (13.3 %)</b>	<b>3 (6.7 %)</b>
<b>Stateless</b>	<b>3 (6.7 %)</b>	<b>1 (2.2 %)</b>
<b>Romanian</b>	<b>2 (4.4 %)</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Other nationalities</b>	<b>6 (13.3 %)</b>	<b>18 (40.0 %)</b>

In the 45 OC investigations, 836 suspects (2018: 654) came to notice for criminal offences; 246 of them were German (2018: 148), 188 Lebanese (2018: 152), 82 Turkish (2018: 52) and 78 Syrian (2018: 54). The number of suspects whose nationality is unclear rose to 85 persons (2018: 37). This corresponds to about half of the suspects with an unclear origin recorded in all 579 OC investigations (178 suspects). Both the increase in the number of suspects as a whole and of those with an unclear nationality are based on two OC investigations conducted in North Rhine-Westphalia in which numerous suspects were identified.

There were hardly any changes compared to the previous year with regard to the breakdown of the investigations by offences. In more than half of the OC investigations, criminal members of clan structures are involved in drug trafficking/smuggling (24 OC investigations; 2018: 23). This field of crime is ahead of the following types of crime: property crime (7; 2018: 12), crime associated with the business world (4; 2018: 2) and illegal immigrant smuggling (3; 2018: 1).



## Fields of crime of the OC groups attributed to clan crime



In 32 OC investigations (2018: 35), the suspects were active at the international level, whereas they only acted at the supra-regional level in six cases (2018: 2) and at the regional level in seven cases (2018: 8). The transnational criminal activities, in particular in connection with the Netherlands, Belgium or Spain, illustrate the networking of the criminal members of clan structures within the EU. Moreover, international crime, e.g. with Turkey, Lebanon or Romania, shows that the persons in question use their contacts to their original home countries to commit crimes.

In addition, eleven clan crime OC groups have links to other groups of perpetrators, including - in four cases each - to other extended families of Mhallami or Arab origin. Four of the eleven OC groups maintained links to outlaw motorcycle gangs or OMCG-type groups.

The investigations conducted in connection with 26 OC groups, that are not attributed to clan crime, provided information pointing to contacts with clan crime OC groups, including extended families of Arab origin (9 OC investigations), clan structures of the Mhallami (7) and the Western Balkans (5).

In 2019, clan crime OC groups caused losses amounting to approx. EUR 1.6 million (2018: approx. EUR 17 million). In the course of their activities, the suspects generated criminal proceeds amounting to approx. EUR 3.6 million (2018: EUR 28 million), of which the authorities provisionally seized one third (approx. EUR 1.2 million; 2018: approx. EUR 22 million).

The average OC potential of clan crime OC groups was 50.5 points (2018: 47.3 points) and was thus above the average value of all OC groups recorded in 2019 (40.6 points). The reasons for this increased average OC potential among these OC groups lie in a large number of OC indicators in the year under review. At present, there is no evidence of a relevant manifestation of individual OC indicators.

## Clan crime in connection with Mhallami and Arab clan families as well as clan families stemming from Turkey

The term "clan crime" covers a broad spectrum of OC groups of different origins which are active in various fields of crime. From a police perspective, the focus is, among other things, on the fight against crime committed by criminal members of extended families of the Mhallami or those of Arab origin or those stemming from Turkey. For this reason, this aspect of clan crime is explained in more detail below.

Organised Crime in the field of clan crime represents only a subset of the criminal activities of criminal members of extended families and therefore outlines the overall phenomenon only in part. Apart from the field of Organised Crime, the manifestations of clan crime often include offences from the field of general and high-volume crime or violations of the Act on Regulatory Offences. In addition, cases of escalating violent crimes often occur in connection with this group of persons. They are often triggered by rivalling or quarrelling clans (so-called tumultuous situations).

In the context of clan crime and in the year under review, the federal and Länder authorities conducted investigations against 38 OC groups (2018: 27) of Mhallami or Arab origin or stemming from Turkey. As in the previous year, North Rhine-Westphalia was affected most with 17 OC investigations (2018: 17), followed by Berlin (6; 2018: 5) and Lower Saxony (5; 2018: 2)<sup>26</sup>. In ten OC investigations, German nationals dominated the criminal activities, followed by Lebanese (9), Turkish (7) and Syrian nationals (6). As already mentioned above, the German suspects in the cases of the German-dominated OC investigations had a corresponding ethnic origin.

In these 38 OC investigations, the investigators recorded 789 suspects (2018: 476), including 236 German (2018: 121), 188 Lebanese (2018: 152), 82 Turkish (2018: 43) and 78 Syrian (2018: 52) nationals. The nationality of 84 suspects (2018: 37) was still unclear.

#### **Dominating nationalities of the OC groups recorded in connection with clan crime committed by persons of Mhallami or Arab origin or stemming from Turkey**

Nationality	2019	2018
German	10 (26.3 %)	6 (22.2 %)
Lebanese	9 (23.7 %)	11 (40.7 %)
Turkish	7 (18.4 %)	4 (14.9 %)
Syrian	6 (15.8 %)	3 (11.1 %)
Stateless	3 (7.9 %)	1 (3.7 %)
Other nationalities	3 (7.9 %)	2 (7.4 %)


Although a high degree of isolation from the outside world is attributed to the extended families of Mhallami or Arab origin or those stemming from Turkey, this aspect is not particularly reflected in the OC investigations conducted against these groups. Only in four OC groups (2018: 2), the investigators detected a homogeneous perpetrator structure. All other OC investigations were heterogeneous in terms of the nationalities of their members. As before, the level of decision-makers within these OC groups is likely to consist largely of criminal members of the closest family circle while suspects of other nationalities are likely to belong to the subordinate levels of the hierarchy.

<sup>26</sup> Please refer to the table "Breakdown of OC investigations in connection with clan crime by Länder and federal authorities" for a detailed breakdown of the OC investigations.

Moreover, there were links between OC groups of Mhallami or Arab origin or stemming from Turkey and other OC groups of the same type. In four cases each, there was a connection to other extended families of Mhallami or of Arab origin. In four cases, there were also contacts with outlaw motorcycle gangs or OMCG-type groups.

As in the previous year, the OC groups of Mhallami or Arab origin or stemming from Turkey generated their criminal proceeds mainly through drug offences. In 21 OC investigations (2018: 13) the suspects were prosecuted for drug trafficking/smuggling, in particular in connection with cocaine and cannabis products. In six OC investigations conducted for property crime (2018: 9), the investigations focused for example on thefts by burglary of a dwelling or of business premises as well as the misappropriation of motor vehicles.

#### **Fields of crime of OC groups recorded in connection with clan crime committed by persons of Mhallami or Arab origin or stemming from Turkey**



In 26 OC investigations (2018: 18), it was possible to prove that the suspects had committed an international crime. In six OC investigations, there were supra-regional links (2018: 1) and, in six other OC investigations, the suspects acted at the regional level only (2018: 8). The links of the clan structures of Mhallami and Arab origin as well as of those stemming from Turkey mainly extended to the Netherlands (especially in connection with OC investigations conducted for drug trafficking/smuggling). In some OC investigations, there are also links to both Lebanon and Turkey - the original countries of origin of many suspects. These links to the former home countries are used, among other things, to launder incriminated funds.

In the year under review, financial losses amounting to EUR 1.5 million (2018: EUR 15.8 million) were recorded for crimes committed by criminally active members of extended families of Mhallami or Arab origin or stemming from Turkey. In this context, they generated criminal proceeds of around EUR 3.5 million (2018: EUR 16.0 million), of which, however, around EUR 1.2 million (EUR 12.2 million) were provisionally seized by the government.

The average OC potential of these clan crime OC groups was 51.8 points in the year under review (2018: 50.1 points) and thus roughly corresponded to the average value of all OC groups recorded in connection with clan crime (50.5 points) in 2019. Here, too, no relevant manifestation of individual OC indicators can be identified at present.

### 3.6.2 Migration and OC

In 2019, 579 investigations were conducted in the field of Organised Crime (OC). In 102 OC groups, suspects with the status "migrant" were identified - this corresponds to a share of 17.6 % (2018: 87 OC groups out of 535 OC groups, which corresponded to a share of 16.3 %).

A total of 6,848 OC suspects were reported in the year under review, including 505 migrants who were under suspicion, which represents a share of 7.4 %.

Compared to the previous year, this represents a small increase by 41 migrants under suspicion in the field of OC (2018: 464 migrants - a share of 7.2 % of 6,483 suspects in total).

In 2019, both the number of reported OC groups (+44 OC groups compared to the previous year) and the number of registered suspects (+365 suspects) increased. This development is reflected in the number of migrants under suspicion in the field of OC registered in 2019 and the number of OC groups in which migrants were identified.

#### ***Migrants***



Analogous to the stipulations in the Police Crime Statistics (PCS), a suspect is referred to as a migrant if he or she is staying in Germany with the residence status "asylum seeker", "persons eligible for national/international protection and persons entitled to asylum", "temporary suspension of deportation", "quota refugee" or "unauthorised residence".

#### **Migrant suspects in OC investigations by nationality (excerpt)**

Nationality	Number of migrants in 2019	Number of migrants in 2018
Lebanon	112	122
Syria	94	55
Albania	37	36
Turkey	37	45
Afghanistan	29	17
Iraq	20	21
Armenia	17	15
India	12	3
Azerbaijan	10	7
Nepal	10	10

For the first time in the year under review, the federal and Länder authorities surveyed whether OC groups were dominated by migrants. The aim is to find out whether one or more migrants within a group assumed the position that determines the criminal activity. In 2019, 46 OC groups were dominated by migrants; this represents a share of 7.9 % of all OC groups registered in 2019. In this context, the dominating nationalities were Albanian (8 OC groups), Syrian (7) and Iraqi (5).

The OC groups dominated by migrants were mainly active in the fields of crime of drug trafficking/smuggling (27 OC groups), property crime (8) and illegal immigrant smuggling (6).

#### Fields of crime of OC groups dominated by migrants

Fields of crime	Number of OC groups
Drug trafficking/smuggling	27
Property crime	8
Illegal immigrant smuggling	6
Counterfeiting/Forgery	2
Money laundering	2
Crime associated with the business world	1

#### Nationalities of OC groups dominated by migrants

Nationality	Number of OC groups dominated by migrants
Albanian	8
Syrian	7
Iraqi	5
Lebanese	4
Turkish	4
Armenian	3
Afghan	2
Stateless	2
Azerbaijani	1
Beninese	1
Chinese	1
Eritrean	1
Indian	1
Cameroonian	1
Kosovar	1
Nigerian	1
Russian	1
Tunisian	1
Unclear	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>46</b>

### 3.6.3 Presumed links between OC groups and terrorism/politically motivated crime



In the year under review, a total of two OC investigations suggested suspected links of OC group suspects to the field of terrorism/politically motivated crime (2018: 4).

One investigation concerned a group dominated by Syrian nationals. The second investigation was conducted against a group dominated by Afghan nationals.

All in all, however, no structural links between OC groups and the field of terrorism/politically motivated crime have been identified so far.

#### Case example: Suspected links between OC and terrorism/politically motivated crime

In the context of investigations conducted for violation of the Narcotic Drugs Act, a suspect of an OC group became known who had allegedly handed over around EUR 60,000 to the so-called Islamic State (IS) in Syria.

In the meantime, this person has been sentenced to 2 years and 3 months of imprisonment for drug trafficking and subsequently to a compounded sentence of 4 years of imprisonment, amongst other things for forming a terrorist organisation and/or supporting the so-called IS.

### 3.7 FIELDS OF CRIME

The majority of the 579 OC groups identified in the year under review continued to be active in the field of crime of drug trafficking/smuggling (34.9 %).

Of all OC investigations, 17.1 % were conducted in the field of crime associated with the business world. In particular the fact that all 37 OC investigations conducted by the customs services of the FKS, who were involved for the first time in the year under review, were conducted in this field of crime contributed to a significant increase in the corresponding number of investigations (2019: 98, 2018: 54).

In the field of property crime, the trend of slightly declining numbers of investigations since 2017 continued (2019: 88, 2018: 93, 2017: 94). The share of all OC investigations conducted in this field was 15.4 %.

The three fields of crime mentioned above thus accounted for more than two thirds of all OC investigations conducted in 2019 (388 out of 579; 67.0 %). Illegal immigrant smuggling came in next with a share of 10.4 %. The increase in the number of OC investigations in this field of crime since 2017 (2019: 60, 2018: 53, 2017: 51) continued in the year under review.

For the second year in a row, the number of OC investigations in which the perpetrator(s) used the internet as an instrument of crime increased in the year under review. In 45 OC investigations, the internet was used as an instrument of crime (2018: 38, 2017: 34). This corresponds to 7.8 % of all reported OC investigations.

In 2019, a total of 33.5 % of all OC groups were active in more than one field of crime (2018: 35.5 %). In accordance with the 2018 reporting period, the groups that were active in more than one field of crime had a higher average OC potential in 2019 again compared to groups focusing purely on one specific field of crime (45.0 points vs. 38.4 points).


There was information pointing to money laundering activities in 40.4 % of all OC groups (2019: 234, 2018: 211). In 150 OC investigations, specific investigations were conducted on suspicion of money laundering pursuant to section 261 of the German Penal Code. This corresponds to 25.9 % of all 579 reported investigations (2018: 116; 21.7 %). In addition to investigations solely dealing with money laundering, primarily OC investigations conducted in the fields of crime of drug trafficking/smuggling (55), crime associated with the business world (29) and property crime (16) included investigations on suspicion of money laundering pursuant to section 261 of the German Penal Code.

## Drug trafficking and smuggling (202 investigations)

With 202 OC investigations recorded in the year under review, the main field of activity in terms of OC in Germany - drug-related crime - was at the same level as in 2018 (201). The share of this field of crime in all OC investigations was 34.9 % in 2019 and thus below the previous year's level of 37.6 %. This slight decrease is partly due to the increase in the share of OC investigations conducted in the field of crime associated with the business world.

Of the OC-groups in the field of drug trafficking/smuggling, 28.2 % operated in more than one field of crime (2018: 33.8 %). The groups were equally active in different fields of crime such as counterfeiting/forgery (9 investigations), property crime (8), crime associated with the business world (8) and money laundering (8). However, violent crimes such as extortions and offences against life (18) were mainly identified as secondary offences. With a share of 32.7 %, OC groups dominated by German nationals continued to prevail in this field of crime (66 investigations). They were followed by OC groups dominated by Albanian nationals (29; 14.4 %). Next came OC groups dominated by Turkish nationals with a share of 11.4 %, who - for the second year in a row - thus represent a decline in the number of OC investigations in the year under review (2019: 23, 2018: 27).

Mainly cannabis products and cocaine were trafficked and smuggled. Those OC groups that trafficked in synthetic drugs repeatedly became more important in terms of the figures recorded (2019: 24, 2018: 22, 2017: 19).





## Nationalities dominating drug trafficking/smuggling

Nationality	2019	2018
German	66	63
Albanian	29	25
Turkish	23	27
Italian	8	8
Lebanese	7	9
Russian	7	4
Dutch	6	7
Syrian	6	3
Greek	5	4
Other nationalities	45	51

### Case example: Drug-related crime

Members of a criminal group used a minibus to follow a truck with container cargo that had loaded gelatin from Brazil. Staging a fictitious police operation, the passengers of this minibus used a flashing blue light to direct the truck to a service area. This is where the passengers of the minibus, who were wearing shirts with "police" printed on them, dragged the driver of the truck out of his driver's cab, handcuffed him, pulled a cloth over his head and put him in the minibus. After approximately 30 minutes, he was released in a small place south of Hamburg.

In the meantime, one of the "fake policemen" had taken the truck to company premises located nearby, where it was received by further persons charged. They broke open the container and took the cocaine hidden in the legal cargo.

Thanks to a tip-off, it was possible to arrest the persons charged while still on the spot.

In total, 1.1 tonnes of cocaine worth a total of around EUR 38.5 million were inside the container. The main suspect is a member of a Hamburg Hells Angels Charter.

The main trial against a total of eight of the persons still in pre-trial detention has been held before Hamburg Regional Court since May 2019.

#### **Short assessment:**

The case exemplifies the high degree of organisation and networking of internationally active groups of perpetrators. In this case, the crime was committed with the involvement of a presumed member of the Hells Angels. The fact that the perpetrators faked police checks illustrates how the OC group committed the offence based on a division of tasks and according to plan.

## Crime associated with the business world (98 investigations)

For the field of crime associated with the business world, a total of 98 OC investigations were reported for the year 2019 (16.9 %; 2018: 55, 10.3 %). The number of OC investigations in this field of crime was thus subject to an increase by 78.2 % in the 2019 reporting period. This is mainly due to the first-time involvement of the customs services of the FKS in the collection of the OC situation data; their OC investigations were all conducted in the field of crime associated with the business world.


Of the groups of perpetrators, 79.6 % acted in an offence-specific manner (2018: 80.0 %). Due in particular to the new involvement of the customs services of the FKS, the OC investigations in the year under review mostly focused on the withholding and embezzlement of wages or salaries pursuant to section 266a of the German Penal Code (32). A major part of the remaining OC investigations conducted in this field of crime referred to various fraud offences. For example, 19 of the investigations were conducted for suspected fraud by means of call centres. In this context, the groups of perpetrators mostly acted to the detriment of elderly people and, among other things, pretended to be police officers in order to deceive their victims.

Investigations in the field of crime associated with the business world are usually time-consuming and resource-intensive. They are characterised by the high complexity and multifaceted nature of the case facts to be examined. In this field of crime, the average duration of OC investigations reported for the year under review was more than 28 months, which is significantly more than the average duration of all OC investigations (20 months).

Crime associated with the business world was again largely dominated by German nationals, although - for the second consecutive year - its share of 36.7 % represents a decrease (2018: 43.6 %, 2017: 47.6 %). However, the share of OC investigations targeting groups that were dominated by Turkish nationals remained at the same level (2019: 34.7 %; 2018: 34.5 %).

### Nationalities dominating crime associated with the business world

Nationality	2019	2018
German	36	24
Turkish	34	19
Serbian	5	-
Israeli	4	2
Kosovar	3	1
Other nationalities	11	9



### Case example: Crime associated with the business world

On the basis of information provided by various parties, it was established that foreign companies registered Eastern European employees with their German social insurance branch office and employed them in meat processing companies in the context of (fictitious) works contracts without the EU work permit, which is sometimes required for citizens of new EU member states. The investigations that were subsequently conducted confirmed leads regarding wages or salaries and social insurance contributions which were not properly declared. The perpetrators' approach was characterised by the foundation of companies that existed for a maximum of two years. Responsible persons were replaced shortly before the respective company was dissolved. These persons were mostly non-expert foreign workers who were not aware of the tasks and responsibilities of an entrepreneur. In this way, an extensive network of companies was set up in order to employ the predominantly Romanian and Polish employees in an inexpensive manner in local meat cutting plants and slaughterhouses through the involvement of foreign companies and subcontractors in Germany, which were founded for this purpose. With a great deal of effort, attempts were made to hide the actual structures of this network of companies.

In the context of investigations conducted under the Code of Criminal Procedure (including links to foreign countries), it was possible to prove that the perpetrators had withheld social insurance contributions amounting to around EUR 17 million and evaded wage tax amounting to around EUR 7.5 million as well as turnover tax in the high two-digit million range. The main perpetrator was sentenced to 7 years of imprisonment. Further perpetrators were sentenced to 5 years of imprisonment or received suspended sentences.

**Short assessment:**

The investigation shows the structured and planned approach of OC groups to place specially recruited employees on the German labour market in the meat processing industry. They consistently exploit the shortage of labour that has long existed in the food processing industry.


## Property crime (88 investigations)

In the field of property crime, 88 OC investigations reported in 2019 represent a decrease by 5.4 % compared to the previous year (2018: 93). In addition, the increase in the number of investigations associated with the business world contributed - amongst other things - to the fact that the share of property crime in all reported OC investigations decreased to 15.2 % (2018: 17.4 %).

The OC groups active in the field of property crime were dominated by Polish (21; 23.9 %) and German (10; 11.4 %) nationals. The most frequently recorded phenomenon within property crime continued to be motor vehicle-related property offences with 42 corresponding OC groups (2018: 43).

A total of 21 groups of perpetrators from this field of crime (23.9 %; 2018: 28; 33.3 %) were active in more than one field of crime. The various secondary activities of the groups were most often in the fields of drug trafficking/smuggling (6) and crime associated with the business world (4).

The fight against thefts by burglary of a dwelling has been in the focus of law enforcement authorities for several years. The federal and the Länder level authorities have taken measures and initiated joint projects in order to be able to put particular law enforcement pressure on those groups of perpetrators who operate in the area of domestic burglary. After a decline in OC investigations involving thefts by breaking and entering in 2018, the level was maintained in the year under review (2019: 35; 2018: 34; 2017: 38). Of the 35 OC groups identified in 2019, 23 were active in the field of theft by burglary of business premises and three in the field of domestic burglary. In nine investigations, the groups in question broke into both business and residential premises.



## Nationalities dominating property crime

Nationality	2019	2018
Polish	21	16
German	10	11
Lithuanian	7	9
Dutch	6	4
Romanian	6	3
Turkish	5	9
Other nationalities	33	41

## Illegal immigrant smuggling (60 investigations)

The number of OC groups in the field of illegal immigrant smuggling continued to rise in 2019 by 13.2 % to a total of 60. This trend has continued since 2014 (2018: 53; 2017: 51; 2016: 38; 2015: 46; 2014: 35).

The smuggling organisations were mainly dominated by German (16) and Iraqi (6) nationals. In most cases, the country of origin of the smuggled persons was Ukraine (12), the Republic of Moldova (9), Iraq (7) and Syria (7). Germany was the destination country or one of the target countries in 57 of the investigations (95.0 %).

### Nationalities dominating illegal immigrant smuggling

Nationality	2019	2018
German	16	12
Iraqi	6	6
Chinese	4	-
North Macedonian	3	2
Syrian	3	5
Ukrainian	3	3
Vietnamese	3	1
Other nationalities	22	24

### Case example: Illegal immigrant smuggling

Since August 2017, the Federal Police have investigated Latvian and Ukrainian citizens on suspicion of commercial smuggling of foreign persons, procurement of false official identity documents and exploitation of labour. The perpetrators were suspected of employing Ukrainian nationals illegally and below the statutory minimum wage within a company founded for construction work. In the context of checks, Ukrainian nationals were identified who presented counterfeit Lithuanian and Romanian identity cards for identification and who were obviously staying illegally in Germany in order to work here. The workers had been previously recruited in Ukraine through a newspaper advertisement. The Ukrainian main suspect and his partner offered general contractors in Germany construction services below the usual prices and subsequently employed the third-country nationals without paying social security contributions. None of the workers were officially registered. The award of subsequent contracts by the construction company of the two persons charged was only made to the Latvian persons charged as so-called bogus self-employed persons. The Latvian persons charged initially received bank transfers on the basis of fictitious invoices. They then repaid this money in cash to the two company owners as clients.

No profits were declared and no taxes were paid for the profits. In addition, the two Ukrainian company owners employed third-country nationals under false pretences through a company founded in Poland and used them to work on construction sites in Germany by means of the

Polish national residence permits obtained in Poland through the fictitious employment. Moreover, the persons charged used forged documents to deceive German tax, trade and residents registration offices and doctored corresponding bookkeeping activities with the help of an office service.

In the meantime, ten search warrants and several arrest warrants were executed, including for the main Ukrainian suspect.

**Short assessment:**

The complexity of the underlying, multi-layered modus operandi shows the immense logistical and organisational effort with which the perpetrators smuggle illegal migrants into the EU in order to subsequently exploit them at a profit without paying social security contributions. The perpetrators are active in more than one field of crime and act internationally and unscrupulously towards victims and authorities.




## Tax and customs crime (42 investigations)

After several years of declining case numbers, the number of OC investigations conducted for tax and customs crime rose again. In this context, 42 OC groups in 2019 correspond to an increase of 7.7 % compared to the previous year (39).

The OC groups in this field of crime increasingly focus on one specific type of offence (2019: 90.5 %; 2018: 89.7 %; 2017: 77.1 %). Half of the 42 OC investigations were conducted on suspicion of cigarette smuggling. Of the OC groups investigated, 14.3 % smuggled other dutiable goods (6 investigations), mainly solar modules. In 18 investigations, German nationals dominated the respective group. Five OC groups were dominated by Turkish nationals.

### Nationalities dominating tax and customs crime


Nationality	2019	2018
German	18	15
Turkish	5	5
Lithuanian	4	2
Chinese	3	3
Polish	3	3
Other nationalities	9	11



## Violent crime (17 investigations)

The number of OC investigations conducted in the field of violent crime is again declining. A decrease by 32.0 % to 17 investigations was recorded (2018: 25; 2017: 33).

For the most part, the groups of perpetrators were under investigation for extortion offences and offences against life. More than half of the groups of perpetrators (52.9%) operated in more than one field of crime. In 13 of the investigations (76.5 %) the suspects were found to be armed (2018: 80.0 %). In addition, links to outlaw motorcycle groups or OMCG-type groups were detected in ten (58.8 %) of the OC investigations reported in this field of crime (2018: 40.0 %).



## Nationalities dominating violent crime

Nationality	2019	2018
German	8	8
Turkish	4	5
Lithuanian	2	4
Russian	1	3
Polish	1	2
Unclear	1	-

## Money laundering (15 investigations)



In the field of money laundering, a total of 15 OC investigations in the year under review almost doubled the number of cases of the previous year (2018: 8). This can be explained by a high number of newly initiated investigations (8) while at the same time many ongoing investigations from previous years were continued (7).

OC groups active in the field of crime of money laundering were largely dominated by German and Italian nationals. Of the 15 OC groups investigated, 14 operated internationally (93.3 %).

### Nationalities dominating money laundering

Nationality	2019	2018
German	3	3
Italian	3	2
Turkish	2	1
Other nationalities	7	2

#### Case example: Money laundering

Since January 2018, the Stuttgart Customs Investigation Office has conducted investigative proceedings on behalf of the Stuttgart Public Prosecutor's Office against several persons charged on suspicion of money laundering on a commercial and gang-type basis. Investigations already conducted into suspected money laundering in connection with the gold trade as well as various suspicious activity reports have led to the suspicion that the persons charged are laundering large sums of incriminated money through the import and export of gold and simultaneous exports of large sums of cash as well as by exploiting (partly their own) companies in Germany and abroad.

In 36 cases between January 2017 and January 2018, a total of approx. EUR 45 million of cash from Dutch drug deals, disguised as payment for alleged gold transactions, were taken to Dubai with the help of money couriers. The fine gold imported in return was exported back to Dubai via Great Britain. According to the bookkeeping records, this gold was sold to a Romanian company that had already filed for bankruptcy in early 2017. On the one hand, this was to explain the whereabouts of the gold and, on the other hand, to legitimise the origin of the funds that flowed to Dubai.

In January 2020, the judgment was pronounced at the Stuttgart Regional Court. The two main defendants were each sentenced to 9 years and 6 months of imprisonment. Two other defendants received prison sentences of 4 years and 9 months and 3 years and 6 months respectively.

#### **Short assessment:**


The case exemplifies the international networking of OC groups and their approach to launder money from illegal activities and allow it to flow into the legal economy.

## Counterfeiting/forgery (12 investigations)

In the field of counterfeiting/forgery, a decrease by 29.4 % to 12 OC investigations (2018: 17) was recorded. In addition to identity documents and driving licences, cash (counterfeit euro), payment cards and employment contracts were forged/counterfeited. In the year under review, the OC groups were mainly dominated by Kosovar nationals. In contrast to previous years, no OC group was found to be dominated by German nationals in 2019 (2018: 4).

### Nationalities dominating counterfeiting/forgery

Nationality	2019	2018
Kosovar	5	4
Albanian	1	-
Armenian	1	-
Bulgarian	1	3
Polish	1	-
Syrian	1	1
Tunisian	1	-
Turkish	1	3
Other nationalities	-	6



## Criminal organisation (12 investigations)

Since the amendment of section 129 of the German Penal Code in 2017 and the accompanying expansion of its scope, the number of OC groups investigated for "formation of a criminal organisation" has increased. While only one OC group was investigated in this field of crime in 2017 and seven in 2018, a total of 12 such OC groups were recorded in the year under review. Four of these OC groups were dominated by Italian nationals.



### Nationalities dominating criminal organisations


Nationality	2019	2018
Italian	4	3
Russian	2	-
Azerbaijani	1	1
German	1	-
Georgian	1	1
Lebanese	1	-
Dutch	1	-
Nigerian	1	-

## Cybercrime (10 investigations)

The number of cybercrime OC investigations decreased by 23.1 % to ten (2018: 13). Three of the OC groups committed digital extortion (30.0 %) by using so-called ransomware, which blocks access to systems or encrypts data stored there. Especially in the darknet, whose contents can only be viewed by using special, anonymising software, a wide range of such and other malware is available with corresponding services: This also enables criminals without specific expertise to commit almost any type of cybercrime. The average OC potential in this field of crime of 36.6 points is slightly below the OC potential of all OC investigations reported for the year under review of 40.6 points.

### Nationalities dominating cybercrime

Nationality	2019	2018
German	2	2
Russian	2	2
Beninese	1	1
Italian	1	-
Cameroonian	1	1
Moldovan	1	1
Ukrainian	1	4
Unclear	1	2



## Crime associated with nightlife (8 investigations)

The number of OC investigations conducted in the field of crime associated with nightlife halved compared to the previous year (2019: 8; 2018: 16). Of the OC investigations, 50 % were conducted on suspicion of trafficking in human beings for the purpose of sexual exploitation and the other 50 % on suspicion of exploitation of prostitutes or forced prostitution. Seven of the eight investigations were conducted against groups whose members can be attributed to only one nationality (87.5 %).

### Nationalities dominating crime associated with nightlife

Nationality	2019	2018
Romanian	3	1
Nigerian	2	5
Chinese	1	1
German	1	1
Hungarian	1	3
Other nationalities	-	5



## Arms trafficking/smuggling (7 investigations)

The number of investigations against OC groups in the field of arms trafficking/smuggling increased to seven in 2019 (2018: 4). The OC investigations were conducted on suspicion of illegal trade in war weapons, firearms as well as ammunition. Three of the seven OC groups were dominated by German nationals. The OC potential in this field of crime, with an average of 48.7 points, is considerably higher than the average OC potential of all OC investigations reported for the year under review (40.6 points).



## Corruption (4 investigations)

In 2019, four OC investigations were conducted on suspicion of corruption (2018: 3). All OC groups were dominated by German nationals. These cases concerned, inter alia, bribery in the health sector and illegal collusion in connection with the awarding of sponsorship contracts. OC investigations conducted on suspicion of corruption have an above-average duration compared to other OC investigations due to their complexity. The investigations reported for the year under review in this field of crime had an average duration of almost three years. The mean value of all reported OC investigations, however, was 20 months.



### Case example: Corruption<sup>27</sup>

The Criminal Police Office of the Land of Schleswig-Holstein and the Kiel Public Prosecutor's Office conducted complex investigative proceedings over several years against a total of 14 suspects on suspicion of taking and offering bribes as well as breach of trust and tax evasion. During the period between 2012 and 2015, the perpetrators reportedly worked together using a network of different companies in order to settle alleged sponsorship and marketing measures in the amount of approx. EUR 6.5 million. However, these were not actually implemented at all or not to the extent stated on the invoices. The invoices were settled without the employer's knowledge via an employee of a large German company who was responsible for public relations there. In return for maintaining the business relationship with the companies of two persons charged, the former employee of this company and numerous other persons from the employee's personal environment are said to have received a large number of benefits in the form of high-value trips, jewellery, electrical appliances or craftsmen's services worth a total of approx. EUR 370,000 through the employee.

In September 2019, the Public Prosecutor's Office in Kiel brought charges against seven persons charged with commercial and gang-type fraud, commercial breach of trust as well as commercial taking and offering bribes in the context of business transactions or for aiding and abetting to the detriment of the German company.

#### **Short assessment:**

The case example illustrates the dimensions of corrupt behaviour. The modus operandi applied resulted in enormous losses to the detriment of the aggrieved company.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. press release no. 53/2019 of the Kiel Public Prosecutor's Office dated 18 December 2019.



## Environmental crime (1 investigation)

In the field of environmental crime, one OC investigation was reported in 2019 - as in the previous year - which was conducted on suspicion of the illegal production and placing of food and pharmaceutical products on the market. The OC group was dominated by German nationals.



## 4 International aspects of Organised Crime



In 2019, 426 OC investigations (2018: 418 investigations) with links to foreign countries were reported. Connections of OC groups from Germany to a total of 123 different countries (2018: 128 countries) were identified. These figures prove the international nature of Organised Crime.

There were 161 OC investigations that had links to the Netherlands, far more than to any other country. These OC investigations were mainly conducted on suspicion of drug trafficking/smuggling. This illustrates the unbroken importance of the Netherlands as a country of origin and as a transit country for deliveries of narcotic drugs to Germany and proves the status of the Netherlands as an important base for internationally operating OC groups, which are predominantly active in the field of drug trafficking.

### Frequency of international links by country (excerpt)

Country	2019	2018
<b>The Netherlands</b>	<b>161</b>	170
<b>Spain</b>	<b>93</b>	85
<b>Poland</b>	<b>75</b>	60
<b>France</b>	<b>73</b>	82
<b>Belgium</b>	<b>63</b>	77
<b>Italy</b>	<b>62</b>	76
<b>Switzerland</b>	<b>56</b>	62
<b>Turkey</b>	<b>56</b>	66
<b>Great Britain</b>	<b>52</b>	59
<b>Austria</b>	<b>51</b>	64

The high number of OC investigations with links to foreign countries requires close cooperation with police authorities worldwide. International police and judicial cooperation is improved in particular through the involvement of the BKA's liaison officers deployed worldwide, numerous bi- and multilateral agreements, the initiation of so-called parallel proceedings and the establishment of Joint Investigation Teams (JIT).

The European Union (EU) has established the EU Policy Cycle as an approach to combating the criminal threats posed to the EU in the field of Serious and Organised Crime. The basis of the EU Policy Cycle is the "Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment" (SOCTA), which is prepared every four years, most recently in 2017, and forms the basis for setting the EU's strategic objectives in the fight against Serious and Organised Crime. It is an analysis of current and future threats which, according to Europol's assessment, are posed by Serious and Organised Crime. This report

also makes recommendations for prioritising in the field of fighting crime at the European level. Germany participates in all ten crime priorities defined in the EU Policy Cycle for the years 2018 to 2021.

In addition to the cooperation with European police authorities, cooperation with the judiciary and other institutions at the European level is necessary in the spirit of a holistic approach (so-called administrative approach) in combating Organised Crime. As a result and on the basis of a decision taken by the Council of the European Union, the European Network on the Administrative Approach (ENAA) was set up in 2010. The EU Member States, the EU Commission, the Secretariat of the Council of the EU, Europol and EUROJUST are represented in it. Representatives of the European Parliament and the EUCPN (European Crime Prevention Network) participate as observers in the meetings of the ENAA. Through the formation of networks and the appointment of National Contact Points (NCP), best practices are to be exchanged across Europe and new initiatives in the development of administrative law approaches to combating OC are to be supported. The BKA took over the task of the NCP within the ENAA network in 2019.

Another international cooperation platform for fighting crime is the Baltic Sea Task Force (BSTF). The heads of government of the Baltic Sea states established the BSTF in Visby, Sweden, in 1996 as part of the implementation of the EU Baltic Sea Strategy to intensify the fight against cross-border crime in the Baltic Sea region. When it was founded, the political goal (also under the aspect of law enforcement) of including the former communist states of the Baltic Sea region in international cooperation was initially in the foreground.

The Task Force includes the personal representatives of the respective heads of state and government of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia and Sweden as well as one representative each of the President of the EU Commission, Interpol and Europol.

Subordinate to the BSTF is the Operative Committee (OPC), in which representatives of the police (BKA), customs (ZKA / central office of the German customs investigation service) and the border guard authorities (BPOL / Federal Police) as well as the judiciary participate.

The OPC is responsible for international cooperation in the field of law enforcement (in addition to OC, especially drug-related crime, illegal immigrant smuggling and environmental crime as well as trafficking in human beings, vehicle trafficking, cigarette smuggling and arms trafficking), the analysis of the crime situation in the Baltic region, the exchange of experience in operational and strategic crime fighting and the preparation of political or legislative proposals.

For 2019 and 2020, Germany has taken over the chairmanship of the BSTF while Poland is responsible for the OPC.

## 5 Overall assessment

The number of OC investigations increased compared to 2018 and is at the same level as in 2017 and the years before. The main reason for the increase in case numbers in 2019 is the first-time recording of OC investigations by the services of the Central Customs Authority's unit responsible for investigating illegal work. These are exclusively investigations that concern the field of crime associated with the business world, which makes it the field of crime second-most frequently affected by OC. As in previous years, most OC investigations were reported in the field of drug trafficking/smuggling. The phenomenon of property crime ranks third in this statistical analysis. The OC investigations conducted in the fields of illegal immigrant smuggling as well as tax and customs crime follow at a greater distance. The development of other fields of crime varies compared to the previous year. For example, in the fields of crime of money laundering and arms trafficking/smuggling, an increase in the number of OC investigations was seen while decreasing case numbers were reported in others such as counterfeiting/forgery, cybercrime and crime associated with nightlife. However, the declines have no impact on the threat potential emanating from these fields of crime. In fact, it remains high.

In most of the OC investigations conducted in Germany, an international commission of the crime and/or cooperation with OC groups from abroad was established. For this reason, an even closer cooperation with Europol and the law enforcement authorities of other countries is necessary in the transnational fight against OC. During the past years, for example, various Joint Investigation Teams (JIT) were set up, in which representatives of various European law enforcement authorities participated.

The reports on groups of Italian Organised Crime and crime committed by outlaw motorcycle gangs slightly increased compared to the previous year; OC groups of Russian-Eurasian Organised Crime, however, saw a slight decrease. The above-mentioned fields of crime continue to have priority in the fight against Organised Crime in Germany.

The internet with its many possibilities for encrypted communication is an important instrument of crime that is now used by many criminal groups. This trend also continued in the reporting period. Especially the darknet, an isolated part of the internet, makes it possible to purchase a wide variety of incriminated products while remaining largely anonymous. In addition to traditional incriminated goods such as drugs, weapons or counterfeit money, this increasingly includes illegal services that enable even laypersons to commit offences in the field of cybercrime.

The separate recording of clan crime for the field of Organised Crime, the effects of migration on Organised Crime in Germany and the suspected links of OC groups to terrorism/politically motivated crime, which was carried out for the first time in 2018, was continued for the year under review.

According to this, 45 OC groups were reported that can be attributed to the field of clan crime (i.e. having criminal members of ethnically isolated subcultures). The number of these OC groups thus remained constant compared to the previous year. The phenomenon continues to be a police priority.

The number of migrants as suspects in OC investigations was again low in 2019 compared to the total number of OC suspects. Nevertheless, it is still necessary to survey the involvement of migrants in Organised Crime and to prevent the formation of new or the consolidation of established OC structures.

With regard to suspected links of OC groups to terrorism/politically motivated crime, only individual personal links of OC suspects to the field of terrorism/politically motivated crime have been detected so far. As in the previous year, there were thus no indications of structural links between OC groups and the field of terrorism/politically motivated crime.

The OC groups identified in 2019 represent the crime structures reported and known to the police. Nonetheless, as in other fields of crime, too, it must be assumed that there is unreported and unrecorded crime, the nature and extent of which cannot be reliably assessed with the help of the basic statistical data. For this very reason, the police must be able to identify OC structures that are not yet recognisable at an early stage.

The priority-setting process of the Organised Crime Commission serves as a tool used to this end. In order to record changes and developments in Organised Crime more quickly and effectively, current priorities and potential future focal points in the fight against Organised Crime are continuously collected within the context of a structured gathering of information by the federal and Länder police forces as well as customs. Depending on the requirements, a project-related cross-Länder cooperation takes place for the purpose of countering particularly outstanding crime developments in a targeted manner, both operationally and strategically.

## 6 Annex

### Groups dominated by German nationals (171)

Fields of crime		
Drug trafficking/smuggling	66	38.6 %
Crime associated with the business world	38	22.2 %
Tax and customs crime	18	10.5 %
Illegal immigrant smuggling	16	9.4 %
Property crime	10	5.8 %
Violent crime	8	4.7 %
Corruption	4	2.3 %
Arms trafficking/smuggling	3	1.8 %
Money laundering	3	1.8 %
Cybercrime	2	1.2 %
Criminal organisation	1	0.6 %
Crime associated with nightlife	1	0.6 %
Environmental crime	1	0.6 %


Changes  
compared to the  
previous year:

**+14.0 %**


ø OC potential:

**40.8 points**

#### Offender structure



#### Active in more than one area of crime?




#### Financial aspects

**Losses:** EUR 137,907,838

**Criminal proceeds:** EUR 128,171,488

**Seizure of assets:** EUR 49,150,245

#### Geographical dimension



## Groups dominated by Turkish nationals (78)

Fields of crime		
Crime associated with the business world	35	44.9 %
Drug trafficking/smuggling	23	29.5 %
Property crime	5	6.4 %
Tax and customs crime	5	6.4 %
Violent crime	4	5.1 %
Illegal immigrant smuggling	2	2.6 %
Money laundering	2	2.6 %
Arms trafficking/smuggling	1	1.3 %
Counterfeiting/Forgery	1	1.3 %


Changes compared to the previous year:

**+9.9 %**


ø OC potential:

**44.3 points**

### Offender structure



### Active in more than one crime area?




### Financial aspects

**Losses:** EUR 447,119,801

**Criminal proceeds:** EUR 307,358,413

**Seizure of assets:** EUR 34,600,603

### Geographical dimension



## Groups dominated by Albanian nationals (31)

Fields of crime		
Drug trafficking/smuggling	29	93.5 %
Property crime	1	3.2 %
Counterfeiting/Forgery	1	3.2 %


Changes  
compared to the  
previous year:

**+19.2 %**


ø OC potential:

**38.7 points**

### Offender structure



### Active in more than one crime area?




### Financial aspects

**Losses:** EUR 483,000

**Criminal proceeds:** EUR 13,529,957

**Seizure of assets:** EUR 469,396

### Geographical dimension





## Groups dominated by Polish nationals (31)

Fields of crime		
Property crime	21	67.7 %
Drug trafficking/smuggling	3	9.7 %
Tax and customs crime	3	9.7 %
Illegal immigrant smuggling	2	6.5 %
Violent crime	1	3.2 %
Counterfeiting/Forgery	1	3.2 %


Changes compared to the previous year:

**+34.8 %**


ø OC potential:

**35.6 points**

### Offender structure



### Active in more than one crime area?




### Financial aspects

**Losses:** EUR 110,186,842

**Criminal proceeds:** EUR 7,614,862

**Seizure of assets:** EUR 430,000

### Geographical dimension




## Groups dominated by Italian nationals (19)

Drug trafficking/smuggling	8	42.1 %
Criminal organisation	4	21.1 %
Money laundering	3	15.8 %
Property crime	2	10.5 %
Cybercrime	1	5.3 %
Crime associated with the business world	1	5.3 %


ø OC potential:

**51.8 points**

### Offender structure



### Active in more than one crime area?




### Financial aspects

**Losses:** EUR 6,695,017

**Criminal proceeds:** EUR 3,109,756

**Seizure of assets:** EUR 683,840

### Geographical dimension



## Groups dominated by Russian nationals (18)

Fields of crime		
Drug trafficking/smuggling	7	38.9 %
Cybercrime	2	11.1 %
Crime associated with the business world	2	11.1 %
Criminal organisation	2	11.1 %
Tax and customs crime	2	11.1 %
Property crime	1	5.6 %
Violent crime	1	5.6 %
Arms trafficking/smuggling	1	5.6 %


Changes compared to the previous year:

**+38.5 %**


ø OC potential:

**44.8 points**

### Offender structure



### Active in more than one crime area?




### Financial aspects

**Losses:** EUR 25,598,137

**Criminal proceeds:** EUR 24,140,800

**Seizure of assets:** EUR 4,000

### Geographical dimension



## Groups dominated by Kosovar nationals (14)

Fields of crime		
Counterfeiting/Forgery	5	35.7 %
Drug trafficking/smuggling	4	28.6 %
Crime associated with the business world	3	21.4 %
Property crime	2	14.3 %


Changes  
compared to the  
previous year:

**+16.7 %**


ø OC potential:

**38.6 points**

### Offender structure



### Active in more than one crime area?




### Financial aspects

**Losses:** EUR 170,000

**Criminal proceeds:** EUR 911,364

**Seizure of assets:** EUR 644,824

### Geographical dimension



## Groups dominated by Lithuanian nationals (14)

Fields of crime		
Property crime	7	50.0 %
Tax and customs crime	4	28.6 %
Violent crime	2	14.3 %
Crime associated with the business world	1	7.1 %


Changes  
compared to the  
previous year:

**-22.2 %**


ø OC potential:

**37.2 points**

### Offender structure



### Active in more than one crime area?




### Financial aspects

**Losses:** EUR 5,358,623

**Criminal proceeds:** EUR 2,163,476

**Seizure of assets:** EUR 167,000

### Geographical dimension



## Groups dominated by Dutch nationals (14)

Fields of crime		
Property crime	6	42.9 %
Drug trafficking/smuggling	6	42.9 %
Criminal organisation	1	7.1 %
Arms trafficking/smuggling	1	7.1 %


Changes compared to the previous year:

**+16.7 %**


ø OC potential:

**39.7 points**

### Offender structure



### Active in more than one crime area?




### Financial aspects

**Losses:** EUR 902,430

**Criminal proceeds:** EUR 828,980

**Seizure of assets:** EUR 73,385

### Geographical dimension



## Groups dominated by Lebanese nationals (13)

Fields of crime		
Drug trafficking/smuggling	7	53.8 %
Property crime	2	15.4 %
Illegal immigrant smuggling	2	15.4 %
Money laundering	1	7.7 %
Criminal organisation	1	7.7 %


Changes compared to the previous year:

**-7.1 %**


ø OC potential:

**56.8 points**

### Offender structure



### Active in more than one crime area?




### Financial aspects

**Losses:** EUR 0

**Criminal proceeds:** EUR 2,220,803

**Seizure of assets:** EUR 1,994,858

### Geographical dimension



## Groups dominated by Serbian nationals (13)

Fields of crime		
Crime associated with the business world	5	38.5 %
Drug trafficking/smuggling	4	30.8 %
Property crime	2	15.4 %
Illegal immigrant smuggling	2	15.4 %


Changes compared to the previous year:

**+8.3 %**


ø OC potential:

**35.6 points**

### Offender structure



### Active in more than one crime area?




### Financial aspects

**Losses:** EUR 6,574,229

**Criminal proceeds:** EUR 6,504,921

**Seizure of assets:** EUR 2,532,207

### Geographical dimension





# Alphabetical overview of all identified nationalities

Country	Dominating groups	Suspects	New suspects
Afghanistan	4	45	25
Albania	31	244	146
Algeria	1	21	17
Argentina	0	2	0
Armenia	5	34	10
Australia	0	3	0
Austria	2	23	15
Azerbaijan	4	25	5
Belarus	1	5	4
Belgium	0	10	5
Benin	2	10	0
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4	35	25
Brazil	0	4	2
Bulgaria	3	125	31
Cameroon	2	23	0
Chile	1	2	2
China	9	36	27
Colombia	2	20	11
Côte d'Ivoire	0	2	0
Croatia	7	35	29
Cyprus	0	1	1
Czech Republic	0	32	1
Denmark	0	5	0
Dominican Republic	0	2	1
Ecuador	0	1	0
Egypt	0	2	0
Eritrea	1	9	8
Estonia	0	4	2
Ethiopia	0	1	1
France	1	24	13
Georgia	2	28	11

Country	Dominating groups	Suspects	New suspects
Germany	171	2.282	1.218
Ghana	1	6	3
Great Britain	1	85	8
Greece	6	38	13
Grenada	0	1	1
Guatemala	0	2	0
Guinea	0	3	1
Guyana	0	2	1
Honduras	0	2	2
Hungary	2	25	16
India	2	19	15
Iran	4	40	15
Iraq	9	90	19
Israel	4	15	14
Italy	19	245	102
Jordan	1	4	0
Kazakhstan	1	11	2
Kosovo	14	198	48
Kuwait	0	1	1
Kyrgyzstan	0	1	1
Latvia	2	17	3
Lebanon	13	220	101
Libya	1	5	0
Lithuania	14	129	46
Luxembourg	0	1	0
Malaysia	0	7	7
Moldova	2	19	5
Montenegro	0	5	3
Morocco	1	36	19
Nepal	1	14	3
Nigeria	5	24	15
North Macedonia	4	33	10
Norway	1	1	1
Pakistan	1	12	6
Paraguay	0	1	1
Philippines	0	2	2

Country	Dominating groups	Suspects	New suspects
Poland	31	431	131
Portugal	0	4	2
Romania	12	242	85
Russian Federation	18	98	55
Serbia	13	120	81
Singapore	0	1	0
Slovakia	0	4	3
Slovenia	1	10	4
Somalia	0	2	1
Spain	1	25	9
Sri Lanka	0	1	1
Suriname	0	3	2
Sweden	3	13	10
Switzerland	2	13	7
Syria	11	167	81
Tajikistan	0	3	3
Thailand	1	15	0
The Netherlands	14	115	54
Togo	0	1	0
Tunisia	1	10	6
Turkey	78	748	375
Turkmenistan	0	1	1
Ukraine	10	133	70
United Arab Emirates	0	4	1
USA	0	15	2
Uzbekistan	0	1	0
Vietnam	9	56	47
Zimbabwe	1	3	3
Not indicated	0	1	0
Stateless	3	21	16
Unclear	8	178	124
<b>Overall result</b>	<b>579</b>	<b>6.848</b>	<b>3.268</b>



**Publishing information****Published by**

Bundeskriminalamt, 65173 Wiesbaden

**Last updated in**

November 2020

**Designed by**

Bundeskriminalamt, 65173 Wiesbaden

**Picture credits**

Bundeskriminalamt

Please visit our website if you wish to download further situation reports of the Bundeskriminalamt:

[https://www.bka.de/EN/CurrentInformation/AnnualReports/annualreports\\_node.html](https://www.bka.de/EN/CurrentInformation/AnnualReports/annualreports_node.html)

This report is published by the Bundeskriminalamt as part of its public relations work.

It is made available free of charge and is not intended for sale.

Reprinting or duplication of this report, including excerpts, is permitted only if the Bundeskriminalamt is named as source (Organised Crime, National Situation Report 2019, page X).