

**BKA**

Organised Crime

National Situation Report 2018

Organised Crime 2018



**535 Investigations targeting
OC groups**



Drug-related crime

More than one third of all OC groups
are trafficking in drugs

201



Property crime

Again, the focus was on motor vehicle-related property
offences, burglary continues to decline

93



Crime assoc. w. the business world

in particular fraud offences to the detriment of elderly
persons

55



6.483
OC suspects



**78,1 % Internationally
committed offences**

Criminal members of ethnically
secluded subcultures

Clan Crime

45 OC groups



Participation of suspected

Migrants

in organised crime



464 Suspects
(7,2 %)



691 Mio. €
Losses



675 Mio. €
Criminal proceeds



72 Mio. €
Prov. seized assets

¹ The terms "investigation" and "group" are continuously used as equivalents. One OC investigation corresponds to exactly one OC group.

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
1 Preliminary Remarks

The National Situation Report on "Organised Crime" for 2018 contains information about the current situation and developments in the field of organised crime (OC) in Germany.

The report is drawn up by the Bundeskriminalamt (Federal Criminal Police Office - BKA) in co-operation with the Landeskriminalämter (Land Criminal Police Offices - LKÄ), the Zollkriminalamt (Central Office of the German Customs Investigation Service - ZKA) and the Bundespolizeipräsidium (Federal Police Headquarters) on the basis of the working definition of "Organised Crime" developed by the Joint Working Party of the German Police and Judicial Authorities (GAG Justiz/Polizei) in May 1990². In this context, data on OC investigations conducted during the period under review are compiled by applying the same set of criteria throughout the country.

The National Situation Report presents the results of law enforcement activities carried out in the field of organised crime. It is a description of the recorded cases, i.e. the crime coming to police notice, but a valid estimation of the possible type and extent of unreported crime cases cannot be deduced from the statistical data. Statements on the development of organised crime are essentially based on the long term monitoring of information relevant to OC.

For the first time, this year's National Situation Report on Organised Crime also covers the offences committed by members of ethnically secluded subcultures (so-called clan crime), the involvement of suspected migrants in organised crime and the links between OC and terrorism/politically motivated crime, on the basis of statistically relevant data.



² Please note the working definition of "Organised Crime" under 3.1.

2 Statistical Overview

OC investigations	2018	2017
Number of OC investigations	535	572
Initial reports	244 (45.6 %)	274 (47.9 %)
Completed investigations	246 (46.0 %)	271 (47.4 %)
Fields of crime		
Drug trafficking/smuggling	201 (37.6 %)	207 (36.2 %)
Property crime	93 (17.4 %)	94 (16.4 %)
Crime associated with the business world	55 (10.3 %)	63 (11.0 %)
Facilitation of illegal immigration	53 (9.9 %)	51 (8.9 %)
Tax and customs crime	39 (7.3 %)	48 (8.4 %)
Violent crime	25 (4.7 %)	33 (5.8 %)
Counterfeiting/Forgery	17 (3.2 %)	17 (3.0 %)
Crime associated with nightlife	16 (3.0 %)	26 (4.5 %)
Cybercrime	13 (2.4 %)	17 (3.0 %)
Money laundering	8 (1.5 %)	9 (1.6 %)
Criminal association	7 (1.3 %)	1 (0.2 %)
Arms trafficking and smuggling	4 (0.7 %)	3 (0.5 %)
Corruption	3 (0.5 %)	2 (0.3 %)
Environmental crime	1 (0.2 %)	1 (0.2 %)
International crime	418 (78.1 %)	455 (79.5 %)
The Internet as instrument of crime	38 (7.1 %)	34 (5.9 %)
Behaviour involving more than one area of crime	190 (35.5 %)	208 (36.4 %)
Average OC potential ³	40.5 points	40.9 points

³ for explanations on the OC potential, see page 18.

Suspects	2018	2017
Number of suspects:	6,483	8,317
Newly identified suspects	2,998 (46.2 %)	3,238 (38.9 %)
Migrants ⁴	464 (7.2 %)	-- --
Number of German suspects	2,023 (31.2 %)	2,436 (29.3 %)
Number of non-German suspects	4,286 (66.1 %)	5,614 (67.5 %)
Turkish nationals	714 (16.7 %)	853 (15.2 %)
Polish nationals	404 (9.4 %)	426 (7.6 %)
Number of suspects whose nationality is unclear, stateless suspects	174 (2.7 %)	267 (3.2 %)
Total number of nationalities	90	105
Number of armed suspects	373 (5.8 %)	449 (5.4 %)
Offender structures		
Number of OC investigations featuring heterogeneous offenders structures ⁵	401 (75.0 %)	417 (72.9 %)
Number of OC investigations featuring homogeneous offenders structures ⁶	134 (25.0 %)	155 (27.1 %)
Financial aspects		
Losses	EUR 691 million	EUR 209 million
Identified criminal proceeds	EUR 675 million	EUR 145 million
Provisionally seized assets	EUR 72 million	EUR 24 million
Number of OC investigations resulting in the provisional seizure of assets	172 (32.2 %)	146 (25.5 %)
Number of OC investigations involving money laundering activities	211 (39.4 %)	213 (37.2 %)

⁴ recorded for the first time in 2018, the year under review

⁵ OC groups whose suspects have various nationalities.

⁶ OC groups whose suspects have the same nationality.


3 Presentation and Evaluation of the Crime Situation

3.1 GENERAL DATA ON INVESTIGATIONS

The total number of investigations conducted against OC groups reveals that OC continues to pose an invariably high threat in Germany. In contrast to the previous year under review, the overall number of investigations dropped from 572 to 535 (-6.5 %) in 2018.

The numbers of OC investigations developed differently at the 16 Land Criminal Police Offices and the Federal authorities (i.e. Bundeskriminalamt (Federal Criminal Police Office), Bundespolizei (Federal Police), Zollkriminalamt (central office of the German customs investigation service)). Even though the overall assessment shows a decrease, not all authorities involved feature a decline in case numbers. The decrease mainly results from the fact that the number of newly reported OC investigations was lower (244 in 2018 compared to 274 in 2017). One reason for this could be the partially more complex and more elaborate conduct of the investigations, for example due to the extensive need for overt and covert investigative measures as well as the use of encrypted communication on the part of the perpetrators. It cannot be ruled out that numerous complex and elaborate investigations are conducted which, as the case may be, are not subsumed under the OC definition. This concerns the complete spectrum of crimes

Development of the number of investigations conducted against OC groups (2009-2018)



The investigations conducted by the federal authorities were assigned to the Länder according to the geographical location of the public prosecutor's office leading the respective investigation (figures of previous year in brackets).

Land	Country	Federation	BAK	Federal Police	Customs authorities	Total	
North Rhine-Westphalia	77	30	4	5	21	107	(111)
Bavaria ⁷	53	25	5	13	7	78	(76)
Berlin	49	10	2	3	5	59	(68)
Lower Saxony	43	15	1	5	9	58	(61)
Baden-Württemberg	37	5	0	2	3	42	(47)
Hesse	26	13	5	5	3	39	(49)
Hamburg	18	9	1	3	5	27	(19)
Schleswig-Holstein ⁸	18	4	1	3	0	22	(22)
Saxony	17	7	0	4	3	24	(30)
Rhineland-Palatinate ⁹	17	1	0	0	1	18	(26)
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern ¹⁰	15	2	0	2	0	17	(12)
Saarland	10	2	0	0	2	12	(8)
Saxony-Anhalt	8	6	1	1	4	14	(14)
Brandenburg	7	3	0	1	2	10	(15)
Thuringia	4	0	0	0	0	4	(7)
Bremen	3	1	0	1	0	4	(7)
Total	402	133	20	48	65	535	
	(437)	(135)	(18)	(46)	(71)		(572)


⁷ One investigation from Bavaria was conducted by a public prosecutor's office in Baden-Württemberg.

⁸ One investigation from Schleswig-Holstein was conducted by a public prosecutor's office in Hamburg.

⁹ Two investigations from Rhineland-Palatinate were conducted by public prosecutor's offices in Hesse.

¹⁰ One investigation from Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania was conducted by a public prosecutor's office in Hesse.


Breakdown of investigations by Land (Land police forces + investigations conducted by federal authorities)¹¹



¹¹ The distribution of the OC investigations exclusively conducted by the respective police forces of the Länder is illustrated in the chart on p. 8 of this national situation report.

All general characteristics and at least one of the specific characteristics listed under a) to c) of the OC definition (explanation see below) must be fulfilled for criminal behaviour to be rated as organised crime. The distribution of the specific characteristics given in the OC definition was as follows in the year under review (multiple recording possible):

- 494 investigations: alternative a)
- 238 investigations: alternative b)
- 101 investigations: alternative c)



In 47 investigations, all three specific characteristics were identified.

The figures presented here essentially correspond to the developments of recent years. Only alternative b) features a significant decrease when compared to the previous year (2017: 284 investigations). If we look at further past years, however, no recurring trend or causality can be recognized.



Working definition of "Organised Crime"

"Organised Crime is the planned commission of criminal offences determined by the pursuit of profit or power which, individually or as a whole, are of considerable importance if more than two persons, each with his/her own assigned tasks, collaborate for a prolonged or indefinite period of time

- a) by using commercial or business-like structures,*
- b) by using force or other means of intimidation, or*
- c) by exerting influence on politics, the media, public administration, judicial authorities or the business sector."*

The working definition of "Organised Crime", which was adopted by the Joint Working Party of the German Police and Judicial Authorities (GAG Justiz/Polizei) in May 1990, serves as the basis for the data collection.

3.2 FINANCIAL ASPECTS



In roughly 93 % of the cases (497 out of 535 OC groups¹²), financial investigations were carried out in addition to offence-specific investigations, in order to clarify the financial situation of the suspects and to identify criminally earned assets.

In addition, concealment activities with respect to the origin of the criminally obtained assets (money laundering activities) were established in approximately 39 % of the cases (211 out of 535 OC groups).

3.2.1 Losses caused by OC groups

Loss



1. *The basic definition of a "loss" is the monetary value (market value) of the illegally obtained property. In the case of fraud-type property offences, loss should be understood as the decrease in the value of the property.*
2. *The values indicated here are direct losses with possible follow-up costs not being taken into account. Losses resulting from OC are therefore recorded by applying the same method as losses appearing in the police crime statistics (PKS).*
3. *Please note that in case of drug deals (activity of more than one third of all OC groups), losses -including monetary losses - are not generally recorded, as the transactions as such are illegal. This also applies to certain forms of cybercrime, counterfeiting/forgery, crime associated with nightlife, violent crime, environmental crime and weapons crime.*

The total loss identified for the year 2018 amounted to approximately EUR 691 million.

The increase of the total loss in comparison to the previous year is mainly due to newly reported losses resulting from tax and customs offences, crime associated with the business world and property crime. Experience has shown that the two first-mentioned types of crime cause the greatest losses.


The annual - and partially very strong - fluctuations in the amount of total losses can be explained by the fact that the total loss identified in an investigation - even if it is conducted over several years - is statistically recorded only in the year during which it was caused. In the years under review, during which the respective investigations are continued, the total losses are not recorded again. In this context, it also plays a role how many new investigations posing a high risk of loss are reported because investigations into crime associated with the business world for example usually last much longer than investigations into other types of crime causing fewer losses. During the previous year, relatively few investigations (three) entailing high losses were reported in the three a.m. fields of crime.

¹² The terms "investigation" and "group" are continuously used as equivalents. One OC investigation corresponds to exactly one OC group.

The 535 investigations mentioned in the National Situation Report on Organised Crime refer to all crimes known to and recorded by the police in connection with activities by OC groups in Germany. Consequently, the total loss of EUR 691 million ascertained in 2018 cannot be considered as a final figure for gauging the actual threat and damage potential emanating from OC groups operating in Germany.

The highest loss identified in an individual OC investigation in 2018 was EUR 201 million. This loss was revealed by an investigation into tax and customs offences (tax fraud).

Development of identified losses



Breakdown of identified losses by field of crime (excerpt)

Fields of crime	2018	2017
1 Tax and customs crime	EUR 410.5 million (59.4 %)	EUR 63.7 million (30.4 %)
2 Crime associated with the business world	EUR 136.4 million (19.7 %)	EUR 59.8 million (28.6 %)
3 Property crime	EUR 128.1 million (18.5 %)	EUR 63.9 million (30.5 %)

3.2.2 Criminal proceeds generated by OC groups

In the course of financial investigations conducted in 2018, criminal proceeds to the amount of roughly EUR 675 million were traced back to 207 (2017: 198) out of 535 OC groups.



The most profitable fields of crime for OC groups were drug trafficking and smuggling with criminal proceeds of roughly EUR 256 million and tax / customs offences with criminal proceeds of roughly EUR 248 million. These were followed by property crime, crime associated with the business world and money laundering.

The highest criminal proceeds identified in an individual OC investigation amounted to roughly EUR 201 million. These were identified in an investigation into tax and customs offences (tax fraud). This investigation also featured the highest identified loss in 2018.

"Criminal proceeds"



"Criminal proceeds" are assets which the offender, a participant in the offence or a third person has obtained from or for the offence or which were identified as instruments of crime. The calculation is based on the gross principle, i.e. all proceeds which an offender has obtained from an offence are taken as a basis without deduction of any prior investments or costs incurred.

Breakdown of the criminal proceeds by field of crime (excerpt)


Fields of crime		2018	2017
1	Drug trafficking/smuggling	EUR 256.0 million (37.9 %)	EUR 38.3 million (26.5 %)
2	Tax and customs crime	EUR 248.4 million (36.8 %)	EUR 5.0 million (3.4 %)
3	Property crime	EUR 71.9 million (10.7 %)	EUR 21.3 million (14.7 %)

3.2.3 Assets provisionally seized by the state

During the year under review 2018, the state provisionally seized assets amounting to roughly EUR 72 million in 172 investigations targeting OC groups (2017: approximately EUR 24 million in 146 investigations).¹³

The highest amount of money seized in an individual investigation conducted against an OC group in 2018 amounted to roughly EUR 16 million. This OC investigation was conducted against a group focussed on fraud, breach of trust and misappropriation.

Total amount of provisionally seized assets and identified criminal proceeds



During the period under review, the share of the provisionally seized assets in the criminally earned proceeds was 10.7 % (2017: 16.6 %). Again, this low share suggests that it is very difficult for the police to uncover the camouflage tactics devised by the OC groups, also with regard to their illicit assets. In addition, newly reported OC investigations are often at a stage where proof has already been found for a loss caused or for the illegal origin of an amount of money but where no assets have yet been confiscated or no seizable assets have yet been identified.

Back on 01/07/2017, the "Act reforming asset recovery under criminal law" came into force. The Act closes identified regulatory gaps and aims at facilitating the implementation of asset recovery measures and the confiscation of assets of unclear origin. The new legal possibilities are also expected to exert some influence on the combat of organised crime. However, we are not yet able to make any qualified and representative statement about the exact effects of the amendment.



Provisional seizure of assets

"Provisional seizure of assets" refers to a legal procedure where assets earned by criminal conduct are provisionally seized by the state in favour of forfeiture or confiscation claims of the state or claims asserted under civil law by injured parties. The provisional seizure is maintained until it is decided with final and binding effect within the framework of court proceedings whether civil claims of aggrieved persons will be satisfied, whether the assets are subject to forfeiture or confiscation or whether they have to be released again.

¹³The fluctuations of the total amounts of proceeds and assets confiscated in comparison to previous years, which are - partially - strong as well, can be explained in the same way as the fluctuations of the total amount of losses.

Breakdown of provisional asset seizures by field of crime (excerpt)

	Fields of crime	2018	2017
1	Crime associated with the business world	EUR 26.8 million (37.1 %)	EUR 3.0 million (12.3 %)
2	Property crime	EUR 23.2 million (32.1 %)	EUR 6.4 million (26.6 %)
3	Drug trafficking/smuggling	EUR 12.9 million (17.9 %)	EUR 10.7 million (44.4 %)



3.3 SUSPECTS




As for the number of suspects, the declining trend of the past years also continued in 2018.

During the year under review, 2023 suspects corresponding to 31.2 % (2017: 2,436 suspects, 29.3 %), German nationals continued to make up the lion's share of all OC suspects. 12.1 % of the German suspects (244) had had a different nationality at birth, i.e. Turkish (70), Russian (63), Iranian (15), Polish (14) and Iraqi (10).


Among the 4,460 non-German OC suspects, Turkish nationals dominated with a number of 714 OC suspects (2017: 853) during the year under review. The share in the total number of suspects amounts to 11.0 % (2017: 10.3 %). These are followed by Polish nationals with 6.2 % (2017: 5.1 %), Albanian nationals with 3.8 % (2017: 2.6 %) and Italian nationals with 3.2 % (2017: 2.8 %). The nationality of 2.5 % of all suspects remained unclear (2017: 3.2 %). 5.8 % of the OC suspects identified (373) were proved to have been armed.¹⁴

The following chart is an extract from the list of suspects reported in the year under review. For a list of all suspects identified, please refer to the annex.

Development of the number of suspects



Number of suspects by nationality (extract)



¹⁴ The unclear nationalities also include stateless suspects and persons of another European nationality.

In the year under review, the number of newly identified OC suspects continued to decline as already observed in previous years.


With 32.1 % (2017: 28.4 %), German nationals continued to make up the largest group among all newly identified suspects. Consequently, their share increased as much as the percentage of Turkish nationals who ranked second again with 13.3 % (2017: 10.8 %). These were followed by Polish nationals with 8.5 % (2017: 4.3 %).

In addition, the number of newly identified Dutch (+ 100.0), Serbian (+ 36.2) and Ukrainian (+ 413.3) nationals rose significantly. A significant decrease, however, was observed in the percentage of newly reported suspects of Romanian nationality (- 54 %). The decisive factor for this decrease were two OC investigations into suspected counterfeiting/forgery and property crime conducted in Hesse and Rhineland-Palatinate which had accounted for 50 and 40 newly identified Romanian nationals in 2017.


The nationality of 2.0 % of all newly identified suspects (2017: 5.3 %) remained unclear.

The adjacent chart shows an excerpt from the list of newly identified suspects in the year under review. They are listed by nationality. For a list of all newly identified suspects, please refer to the attached alphabetical overview.

Development of the number of newly identified suspects



Number of newly identified suspects by nationality (excerpt)



3.4 STRUCTURES OF THE OC GROUPS

On average, between 12 and 13 suspects conspired in each of the identified OC groups. In roughly two thirds of the OC investigations, the groups consisted of up to ten suspects (65.8 %, 2017: 66.8 %). In 32.0 % of the OC investigations, they counted eleven to 50 suspects (2017: 30.4 %) and in 1.5 % of the OC investigations more than 50 suspects (2017: 1.2 %) were recorded. The smallest group of perpetrators consisted of three members (2017: 3) and the largest one counted 135 members (2017: 816¹⁵). The following chart is an


extract from the dominant nationalities ascertained in the year under review. In addition to the groups dominated by German nationals, it pictures the ranking list of the ten most frequently represented groups dominated by other nationalities. Please find further information about the nationalities listed here as well as an alphabetical breakdown of all groups identified in the annex.

Predominant nationalities



For the identification of the dominant nationality of an OC group, the nationality of the persons holding leading positions within the OC groups is pivotal. This does not necessarily mean that most group members have this nationality.

Number of groups listed by dominant nationality (extract)




In addition to checking all reported OC investigations for OC relevance, we assessed all OC groups in terms of their level of organisation and professionalism, which is expressed by the so-called "OC potential". The OC potential is calculated by counting and weighting the applicable indicators taken from the list of "General indicators for identifying OC-relevant cases".

With this method, the stages of the offence are divided into preparation and planning of the offence, commission of the offence and use of the crime proceeds. As against 2017, the average OC potential remained nearly stable (40.5 points compared to 40.9 points in the previous year). Groups with an average OC potential (between 30 and 60 points) represented the major share and as in the previous year, there continued to be only a few groups with a very low or a very high OC potential.

¹⁵ This investigation concerning crime associated with the business world was conducted against 816 Lithuanian suspects in BW from 2012 to 2017.

Besides this, OC groups are divided into homogeneous or heterogeneous group structures. A group whose members are all of the same nationality is designated as homogeneous.

In 2018, 134 OC groups were homogeneously structured (2017: 155) and consequently, 401 OC groups (2016: 417) featured a heterogeneous structure.



3.5 STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS

Information obtained through investigations and analyses of OC groups proves that their members join up as a result of various motives. One of these motives can be the sharing of common grounds (e.g. of socio-cultural or linguistic nature). We are now going to look at OC groups who share such common grounds within their structures and are relevant to the criminal police.



3.5.1 Outlaw motorcycle groups

In 2018, twelve OC investigations (2.2 % of all OC groups) targeted OMCG members (166 suspects). Thus, the declining trend observed over the past years continued during the year under review (2017: 20).¹⁶

Five of the OC investigations targeting OMCG members were conducted into suspected drug trafficking and smuggling (cannabis, cocaine, heroin and synthetic drugs) and another five into violent crime (extortion, homicide and bodily injury).

Two thirds of the outlaw motorcycle groups were headed by German nationals (eight groups), three by Turkish nationals and one by Polish nationals.

Outlaw motorcycle groups



In Germany, there are about 700 chapters/charters comprising approximately 10,000 members of outlaw motorcycle groups. These include local associations of the internationally known outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMCG) Bandidos MC (), Gremium MC () and Hells Angels MC () and their supporter clubs.

Moreover, there are motorcycle clubs which, for the most part, are active at regional level only. Crime committed by members of these groups ranges from drug offences and acts of violence to crime associated with nightlife or the business world.

¹⁶ Multiple recordings are possible as individual OC investigations were directed against several groups.

Hells Angels MC

In 2018, seven OC investigations (2017: 17) were directed against a total of 102 members of the Hells Angels MC. In this context, three of the OC investigations focussed on German nationals, three on Turkish nationals and one on Polish nationals.

Most of the OC investigations directed against the Hells Angels MC concerned drug trafficking and smuggling (4), followed by violent crime (2) and crime associated with the business world.

Among the 102 Hells Angels MC members, German nationals (56 suspects) and Turkish nationals (30 suspects) were most strongly represented.

Bandidos MC

Two OC investigations, predominantly targeting German nationals (2017:1), were conducted against a total of 11 suspects (10 Germans and 1 Belgian national) belonging to the Bandidos MC.

One of the two OC investigations concerned suspected violent crime and the other one dealt with suspected counterfeiting (cash).

Further OMCG groups

Three OC investigations (2017: 3) were conducted against a total of 53 suspected members of other MCs (52 German suspects and one Dutch suspect), i.e. one OC investigation each against members of the No Surrender MC, the Gremium MC and the Freeway Rider's MC.

In addition, 36 cases (2017: 46) featuring links to members of OMCG groups were ascertained.¹⁷

¹⁷ Analogous to footnote 16.

3.5.2 OMCG-type groups

The number of OC investigations conducted against members of OMCG-type groups (127 suspected members) dropped to a total of nine (2017: 22).

OC investigations against members of OMCG-type structures were exclusively conducted on suspicion of drug trafficking and smuggling as well as violent crime. Four of the OMCG-type groups were headed by German nationals, three by Turkish nationals and the others by Iraqi, Macedonian and Russian nationals (one investigation each).

Furthermore, six investigations (2017: 13) targeted OC groups featuring links to members of OMCG-type groups.

OMCG-type groups



In comparison to real outlaw motorcycle gangs, OMCG-type groups have similar hierarchical structures, have the same self-image and publicly demonstrate their shared identity by means of clothes or symbols. They are active in the same fields of crime and are equally unwilling to cooperate with the police. The difference to outlaw motorcycle groups is that there is no "obligation" to have a motorcycle. The motorbike only plays a subordinate role for them. Due to the short life span of many of these associations and the often high fluctuation of members, the numbers of the existing clubs and their members are subject to a dynamic development.

United Tribuns

In 2018, four OC investigations were conducted against members of the United Tribuns (2017: 5).

In this context, three of the OC investigations predominantly targeted German and one Turkish suspects.

In the OC investigations targeting the United Tribuns, violent crime (3) prevailed over drug trafficking and smuggling (1).

Among the 38 suspected members of the United Tribuns, German nationals (15) and Turkish nationals (10) were most frequently represented.

Osmanen Germania BC

Two OC investigations dealt with a total of 68 suspected members of Osmanen Germania BC (2017: 5). The suspects included 29 Turkish, 26 German and 3 Serbian nationals. The two OC investigations predominantly targeted Turkish nationals involved in drug trafficking and smuggling as well as violent crime.

In July 2018, the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community (Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat) ordered a nation-wide ban of the OMCG-type group Osmanen Germania BC and its hybrid organisations. The ban is based on section 3 subsection 1 of the Associations Act, as the purpose and activities of Osmanen Germania BC are in breach of criminal

law and as the club poses a serious threat to individual legal interests and the general public. Before the club was banned, Osmanen Germania BC counted 16 chapters throughout Germany. In connection with the ban, search warrants were carried out against club members in Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Hesse and Rhineland-Palatinate.

The club claimed to be a boxing club (BC) and pretended to aim at taking juveniles "away from the street". In reality, however, its common purpose was violent geographical expansion and a power boost as well as self-assertion against rival OMCG-type groups. In the past, serious bodily injury and attempted homicide were repeatedly committed especially during conflicts with the meanwhile dissolved Kurdish OMCG-type group "Bahoz".

Further OMCG-type groups

Each of three OC investigations targeting a total of 21 suspected members of further OMCG-type groups (2017: 8) concerned drug trafficking and smuggling. The three OC investigations predominantly targeted German, Iraqi and Macedonian nationals. With ten members, the German nationals were most strongly represented among the suspects.

3.5.3 Italian Organised Crime (IOC)

In the year under review, 13 OC investigations (2017: 14) were directed against members of Italian Mafia groups.

These were mainly dedicated to cocaine trafficking. Besides, the offences committed by Italian Organised Crime groups (IOC) included money laundering and motor vehicle property offences. Altogether 197 suspects were reported in these OC investigations, 118 of them being Italian nationals. The remaining suspects had different nationalities (German and Albanian).

All in all, four of the other OC groups identified in Germany in 2018 had links to members of Italian Mafia groups (2017: 8). There appeared to be links to the 'Ndrangheta and the Camorra. Five of the investigations conducted against IOC groups also featured links to other IOC groups.

Of the overall 16 OC investigations predominantly targeting Italian nationals, twelve were attributed to IOC groups. In three further OC investigations, at least some links to Italian Mafia groups were identified.

One OC investigation was conducted against an IOC group consisting of ten suspects who could not be positively attributed to a specific organisation at the time of recording.

'Ndrangheta

In 2018, nine OC investigations (2017: 7) against a total of 124 members of the 'Ndrangheta were counted. The investigated groups were all dominated by Italian nationals.

The focus of the investigations targeting the 'Ndrangheta was on drug trafficking and smuggling (four investigations); three investigations were conducted into suspected formation of a criminal organisation and two into suspected money laundering.

Camorra

During the year under review, the law enforcement authorities led two OC investigations (2017: 2) against 22 members of the Camorra.

One investigation predominantly targeted German nationals for suspected drug trafficking and smuggling. Another investigation predominantly targeted Italian nationals suspected property crime.

Cosa Nostra

In 2018, 41 members of the Cosa Nostra were the subject of one OC investigation (2017: 3). This OC group was dominated by Italian nationals active in the field of drug trafficking and smuggling.



3.5.4 Russian-Eurasian Organised Crime (REOC)

In addition to a common cultural background, the Russian language is the unifying element of Russian-Eurasian Organised Crime. Consequently, all OC structures are taken into consideration which:

- are dominated by persons who were born in one of the post-Soviet states and therefore have a corresponding cultural background or
- are dominated by persons who were born outside a post-Soviet state but consider themselves members of an ethnic group of one of the post-Soviet states due to their culture, history, language, traditions or ancestors.

In Germany, this includes especially the so-called "Spätaussiedler" (late repatriates). An essential part of REOC is the ideology of the traditionally so-called "thieves in law", i.e. criminal authorities who have their own system of standards and values and adhere to their own code of conduct. The syndicates that emerged from the local gangs of post-Soviet Russia of the 90ies are closely associated with this ideology. The REOC phenomenon comprises all criminal and related legal and illegal economic activities which are performed under this "concept". A central element is the so-called "obchak" (cash register for thieves). All members or levels of the strictly hierarchically structured organisations, which isolate themselves from both inside and outside, are obliged to pay contributions to it.

In 2018, a total of 26 investigations (2017: 29) were conducted against groups attributed to REOC (i.e. 4.9 % of all OC investigations). Consequently, the number of REOC investigations conducted dropped by 10.3 % compared to the previous year. In 21 investigations, the suspects were found to have acted at international level. The other investigations revealed activities at regional and supraregional level only.

Post-Soviet countries



- *Armenia*
- *Azerbaijan*
- *Estonia*
- *Georgia*
- *Kazakhstan*
- *Kyrgyzstan*
- *Latvia*
- *Lithuania*
- *Republic of Moldova*
- *Russian Federation*
- *Tajikistan*
- *Turkmenistan*
- *Ukraine*
- *Uzbekistan*
- *Belarus*


Seven REOC groups were dominated by Russian nationals, four by Armenian nationals and another four by Georgian nationals.

In addition, 80 German and 51 Russian nationals were recorded in all REOC investigations. Most of these German suspects were born outside of a post-Soviet state but consider themselves members of an ethnic group of one of the post-Soviet states.


In the year under review 2018, 42 Lithuanian suspects were reported. The OC investigation into family emergency scams, which had been pending since 2012, was concluded in 2017 and as a consequence, the previously reported 816 Lithuanian suspects were no longer recorded for 2018.

The REOC groups were mainly dedicated to property crime, drug trafficking and smuggling, violent crime and cybercrime.

Number of REOC investigations by dominant nationality



Fields of crime of the REOC groups



In 2018, eight investigations were conducted against OC groups dominated by Chechen nationals and seven of them inter alia concerned violent crime and extortion offences.


Chechen criminal groups are characterized by an above-average propensity to escalation and violence. In three investigations they came to notice for attempted and completed homicides.

Ethnic Chechens



When the National Situation Report on Organised Crime is prepared, the investigating agencies have the option to indicate an ethnic origin in addition to the nationality. This also applies to the Chechen ethnicity which is inter alia recorded under the Russian nationality.

In addition, seven investigations were conducted against REOC groups featuring links to other REOC groups in 2018 (2017: 10).



3.6 CURRENT MANIFESTATIONS

In addition to traditional manifestations of OC, such as outlaw motorcycle gang crime, IOC and REOC, more current manifestations are observed time and again. Within the framework of data collection for the National Situation Report on Organised Crime 2018, the Federation and the Länder therefore agreed for the first time to include data gathered on the crime of ethnically secluded members of subcultures (so-called clan crime) and the possible impact of migration on organised crime in Germany. Besides, the data were evaluated with regard to suspected links of the OC groups to terrorism/extremism () and politically motivated crime (PMC).

3.6.1 Criminal members of ethnically secluded subcultures (clan crime)



The national Situation Report on Organised Crime 2018 contains a detailed examination of criminal members of ethnically secluded subcultures (so-called clans)¹⁸ for the first time. To date, there has been no binding nationwide definition of the term clan crime. For a better description of clan crime in the context of organised crime, the federal and Land authorities have compiled classification criteria and indicators of clan crime on which the below-listed results are based.

However, the definitional attempts for clan crime, which already exist in a few Länder, remain unaffected by the newly developed classification criteria and indicators.

In view of these new recording criteria, the information provided about clan crime will be limited to the year 2018.

3.6.1.1 Clan crime - Overview for the year 2018

The classification criteria and indicators enable us to subsume a broad spectrum of clan-based OC groups under clan crime and to thus recognize emerging comparable structures at an early stage and suppress them effectively. Therefore, an overview is, first of all, given over the key figures of clan crime which take into account all existing forms of this phenomenon. Chapter 3.6.1.2 will then look in greater detail into the clan structures of Arab origin or stemming from Turkey which have been identified in a number of Länder and are currently in the focus of the police and the media.

In 2018, the federation and the Länder recorded 45 OC investigations which could be attributed to clan crime. This corresponds to 8.4 % of all OC investigations recorded in the year under review. The OC investigations concerning clan crime were directed against

- 25 OC groups of Arab ethnic origin,.
- eight OC groups stemming from the Western Balkans,
- three OC groups stemming from Turkey¹⁹,
- one OC group stemming from the Maghreb countries and
- eight OC groups of yet another origin.

¹⁸ For better legibility, the term "clan crime" will be used hereinafter.

¹⁹ The term "stemming from Turkey" is used to make a distinction between regional (here: Turkish territory) and ethnic origin.

Just under half of the OC investigations attributed to clan crime were conducted in North Rhine-Westphalia (22 OC investigations²⁰). The other OC investigations targeting criminal clan structures were distributed between Bavaria (7 OC investigations²¹), Berlin (5 OC investigations), the Saarland (4 OC investigations²²), Baden Württemberg and Lower Saxony (3 OC investigations each) as well as Bremen (1 OC investigation).

Classification criteria and indicators for clan crime associated with organised crime*



The National OC Situation Report defines clan crime as offences committed by members of ethnically secluded sub-cultures. *It is characterized by family relationships, a common ethnic origin and a high degree of seclusion of the offenders, which facilitates the commission of crime or makes its detection difficult. This is accompanied by an own value system and the general rejection of the German legal system.*

In this context, clan crime can feature one or several of the following indicators:

- *a strong focus on the mostly patriarchal-hierarchical family structure.*
- *a lack of willingness to integrate, with aspects of territorial concentration,*
- *the provoking of escalations even for banal reasons or in case of minor infringements of law,*
- *the exploitation of group-immanent mobilization and threat potentials.*

**These classification criteria and indicators are applied whenever a case falls under the OC definition.*

In nearly one fourth of the cases, the OC investigations predominantly targeted Lebanese nationals (11 OC investigations), followed by German nationals (8 OC investigations) and Turkish nationals (4 OC investigations). Moreover, three OC investigations predominantly targeted Albanian and Serbian nationals and two OC investigations suspects of Macedonian nationality, most of whom can be attributed to clan crime associated with the Western Balkans.

In the 45 OC investigations, 654 suspects were recorded, including 152 Lebanese, 148 German²³, 54 Syrian and 52 Turkish nationals. The high number of suspects of unknown nationality (37 suspects) is striking. This corresponds to nearly one quarter of all suspects of unsolved nationality (160 suspects) recorded in all 535 OC investigations.

In slightly more than half of the OC investigations, the OC groups linked with clan crime were found to have been engaging in drug trafficking and smuggling (23 OC investigations) and in roughly a quarter of the OC investigations in property offences (12 OC investigations). The other OC investigations followed at a much lower level and were spread, for example, between crime associated with nightlife (3 OC investigations), crime associated with the business world (2 OC investigations), violent crime or money laundering (1 OC investigation each).

In 35 OC investigations the offenders were found to have acted at international level; in two OC investigations the offences were found to have been committed at supraregional level, and in eight

²⁰ One investigation in North Rhine-Westphalia was conducted by the customs authority.

²¹ One Bavarian investigation each was conducted by the Federal Police and the customs authority.

²² One investigation in the Saarland was conducted by the customs authority.

²³ Some of the German suspects have an Arab migrant background (e.g. Lebanese, Kurdish, Mhallamiye).


OC investigations, the criminal activities appeared to have been limited to one region. In the international context, the criminal members of the clans are mainly networked with associates in other European countries, above all Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Austria.

Furthermore, nine OC groups attributed to clan crime have links to other groups of perpetrators including links to OMCG groups in five cases and links to other clans of Arab origin or from the Western Balkans in one case each. In addition, 18 further OC groups had links to clan crime, e.g. to clan structures from the Western Balkans (8 OC investigations), of Arab origin (5 OC investigations) or stemming from Turkey (2 OC investigations).

Dominating nationalities of the OC groups attributed to clan crime

Nationality	Number of OC groups	Percentage
Lebanese	11	24.4 %
German	8	17.8 %
Turkish	4	8.9 %
Albanian	3	6.7 %
Serbian	3	6.7 %
Syrian	3	6.7 %
Hungarian,	3	6.7 %
Macedonian	2	4.4 %
unsolved	2	4.4 %
Further nationalities	6	13.3 %

Fields of crime of the OC groups attributed to clan crime



In 2018, OC groups attributed to clan crime caused an (identified) loss of roughly EUR 17 million as a result of their offences. In the course of their activities, the suspects earned criminal proceeds of approximately EUR 28 million during the year under review, of which the lion's share (approximately EUR 22 million) was provisionally seized by the state.

The average OC potential of clan-based OC groups amounted to 47.3 points and thus exceeded the average value of all OC groups recorded in 2018 (40.5 points). The reasons for this increased average OC potential of clan-based OC groups result from manifold OC indicators in the year under review. A relevant manifestation of individual OC indicators is not discernible at present.

3.6.1.2 Clan crime - Crime of suspects belonging to clans of Arab origin or stemming from Turkey

As already illustrated, clan crime includes a broad spectrum of OC groups of different origins who are active in numerous fields of crime. At present, the mainly concerned Länder Berlin, Bremen, Lower Saxony and North-Rhine Westphalia focus on combating criminal members of clans of Arab origin or stemming from Turkey. Especially persons of Mhallamiye, Lebanese or Palestinian ethnic origin are in the centre of attention in this context. Therefore, this area will now be examined in detail.

Crime committed by suspects belonging to clans of Arab origin or stemming from Turkey



Criminal members of clans of Arab origin or stemming from Turkey are increasingly active in the field of organised crime and engage in a wide range of different crimes in this context. Although this circle of persons is primarily examined in connection with organised crime, this form of clan crime also extends to other areas.

Frequently, the criminal clan members come to notice for breaches of regulations and offences that, for the most part, fall under general crime and high-volume crime. In addition, these groups of persons are often involved in so-called turmoil situations. Such situations are characterised by escalating violence and are often triggered between rivalling or disputing clans. Assumed routine interventions can quickly turn into confusing and complex riot police operations requiring considerable staff resources.

In 2018, a total of 28 investigations were conducted against OC groups of Arab origin or stemming from Turkey in the federation and the Länder (25 were of Arab origin and three stemmed from Turkey). In North Rhine-Westphalia, 17 OC investigations²⁴ were conducted; the other OC investigations were pending at public prosecutor's offices in Berlin (5), Lower Saxony (2), Bavaria²⁵, Baden Württemberg, Bremen and Saarland²⁶ (1 each).

Eleven OC investigations predominantly targeted Lebanese nationals, followed by German nationals (6 OC investigations), Turkish nationals (4 OC investigations) and Syrian nationals (3 OC investigations). Please note, however, that the suspects in the OC investigations predominantly targeting German nationals had a Lebanese, Turkish or Kurdish migrant background.

In the 28 OC investigations targeting suspected criminal members of clans of Arab origin or stemming from Turkey, 496 suspects came to notice. Of these, 152 were Lebanese nationals and 124 were of German nationality²⁷. In addition, 53 Syrian, 44 Turkish and nine Afghan suspects were recorded. Of the 37 suspects of unsolved nationality in all OC investigations attributed to clan crime, the major part (34 suspects) was recorded in OC investigations targeting criminal members of clans of Arab origin or stemming from Turkey.

²⁴ One investigation in North Rhine-Westphalia was conducted by the customs authority.

²⁵ The Saarland-based investigation was conducted by the customs authority.

²⁶ The Bavarian investigation was carried out by the Federal Police.

²⁷ Some of the German suspects have an Arab migrant background (e.g. Lebanese, Kurdish, Mhallamiye).


Dominating nationalities of OC groups attributed to clan crime which are of Arab origin or stem from Turkey

Nationality	Number of OC groups	Percentage
Lebanese	11	39.3 %
German	6	21.4 %
Turkish	4	14.3 %
Syrian	3	10.7 %
Further nationalities	4	14.3 %

In general, the clans of Arab origin and those stemming from Turkey are characterized by a high degree of seclusion from the world outside. However, only in two OC investigations conducted against these OC groups was a homogeneous offender structure identified. The other 26 OC investigations revealed a heterogeneous composition of offender structures which comprised suspects of various nationalities. It appears likely, however, that the level of decision-makers within these OC groups primarily consists of close family members whereas suspects of other nationalities are employed for "dirty work" only. In no more than five of the 28 OC investigations were links identified to other OC groups including two cases revealing links to OMCG groups and one case revealing links to another clan structure stemming from Turkey.

In 2018, half of the OC investigations associated with crime committed by clans of Arab origin or stemming from Turkey were conducted into drug-related offences (i.e. 14 OC investigations mainly involving cannabis products and cocaine). Another field of crime described here is property crime (9 OC investigations) with the spectrum ranging from theft by breaking and entering (burglary of business and domestic premises) to cases concerning motor vehicle offences (fencing, misappropriation).

Fields of crime of OC groups attributed to clan crime which are of Arab origin or stem from Turkey



In 19 OC investigations, the suspects were proved to have committed offences at international level. In one OC investigation, supraregional links emerged and in eight further OC investigations, the suspects' activities were found to have been limited to a regional level. At European level, the links of the clan structures of Arab origin or stemming from Turkey mainly extended to German neighbour countries such as the Netherlands (especially in OC investigations into drug trafficking and smuggling), Belgium and France. In addition, some OC investigations feature links to non-European countries such as Lebanon and Turkey.

In addition, there are leads suggesting that clan structures of Arab origin and those stemming from Turkey are using contacts and links to their former home countries, i.e. to Lebanon or Turkey, e.g. for money laundering. They also have links to Scandinavia (e.g. Sweden) where clan structures of the same origin exist.

During the year under review, a financial loss amounting to EUR 15.8 million was identified as resulting from offences committed by criminally active members of clans of Arab origin or stemming from Turkey. Their activities earned them criminal proceeds totalling EUR 16.2 million. However, two thirds of this sum (i.e. EUR 12.4 million) were provisionally seized by the state. Against this backdrop, an OC investigation into a Berlin-based clan of Arab origin should be mentioned. Its suspected criminal members are believed to have enriched themselves by EUR 9.2 million by committing numerous property offences (domestic burglary, burglary of shops and banks). This asset was provisionally seized by the state during the year under review.

In 2018, the average OC potential of OC groups of Arab origin or stemming from Turkey amounted to 50.3 points and thus slightly exceeded the average value of all OC groups attributed to clan crime that was recorded in 2018 (47.3 points). In this case as well, it is not possible to recognize a relevant manifestation of individual OC indicators.

3.6.2 Migration and OC



In 2018, 535 investigations were conducted in the field of Organised Crime. In 87 of these OC investigations, migrants were identified as suspects which corresponds to a share of 16.3 %.²⁸ The fields of crime of OC groups, for which migrants were recorded as suspects, included drug trafficking and smuggling (37 OC investigations), property crime (16 OC investigations) and facilitation of illegal immigration (15 OC investigations).

All in all, 6,483 OC suspects were reported in the year under review, including 464 (7.2 %) suspected migrants.

Migrants

Analogous to the stipulations in the Police Crime Statistics (PCS), a suspect is a migrant if he or she is staying in Germany under the residence status of "asylum seeker", "person entitled to international/national protection", "person entitled to asylum or to temporary suspension of deportation (Duldung)", "quota refugee" or "unauthorised resident".



Suspected migrants in OC investigations by nationality (excerpt)

Nationality	Number of migrants
Lebanon	122
Syria	55
Turkey	45
Albania	36
Russian Federation	25
Iraq	21
Afghanistan	17
Armenia	15
Kosovo	12
Nepal	10

²⁸Due to an adjustment of the data collection modalities, it was possible for the first time in 2018 to make qualified statements about the involvement of suspected migrants in OC investigations. However, the first-time recording of the category "migrants" does not allow for any comparison to previous years.

OC investigations including suspected migrants: Breakdown by type of crime

Type of crime	OC groups	Percentage of all OC investigations
Drug trafficking/smuggling	37	(6.9 %)
Property crime	16	(3.0 %)
Facilitation of illegal immigration	15	(2.8 %)
Crime associated with the business world	8	(1.5 %)
Crime associated with nightlife	4	(0.8 %)
Tax and customs crime	4	(0.8 %)
Violent crime	3	(0.6 %)

A breakdown of the fields of activity by the predominant nationality of the suspected migrants involved reveals the following picture²⁹:

- In OC investigations including suspected migrants and concerning drug trafficking and smuggling, above all Albanian (12 investigations), Syrian (10 investigations) and Turkish (10 investigations) migrants were involved.
- In OC investigations including suspected migrants and concerning property crime, above all Turkish (6 investigations), Syrian (4 investigations), Lebanese (3 investigations) and Kosovar (3 investigations) migrants came to notice.
- In OC investigations including suspected migrants and concerning facilitation of illegal entry, mainly Iraqi (5 investigations), Syrian (4 investigations) and Afghan (3 investigations) migrants were found to have been active.
- In OC investigations including suspected migrants and concerning crime associated with the business world, primarily Turkish (4 investigations) and Bosnian-Herzegovinian (2 investigations) migrants were involved.
- In OC investigations including suspected migrants and concerning crime associated with nightlife, mainly Nigerian migrants (3 investigations) were found to have been active.
- In OC investigations including suspected migrants and concerning tax and customs offences, exclusively Syrian migrants (4 investigations) came to notice.
- In the area of violent crime, Lebanese migrants (2 investigations) were involved.

In conclusion, migrants also come to notice in the area of organised crime and above all in connection with drug trafficking and smuggling.

²⁹As for the issue of migration, we are unable to ascertain on the basis of the available statistical data, whether the migrants recorded also played the a.m. dominating role (cf. chapter 3.3) within the OC groups or not. There might be matches between the nationality of the migrants and the dominating nationality of an OC group. However, the underlying data basis does not suffice to carry out a specific analysis. We are therefore only examining the suspected migrants in relation to individual fields of crime here.

3.6.3 Suspected links between OC groups and terrorism/politically motivated crime



In the year under review 2018, a total of four OC investigations hinted to links of suspects of the OC groups to terrorism/politically motivated crime (/PMC).

Two investigations concerned groups dominated by Turkish nationals and in one investigation each, the dominating nationality was Afghan or Russian/Chechen.

All in all, however, no structural links of OC groups to terrorism/politically motivated crime have been detected as yet.

Example of a specific case: Suspected links between OC and /PMC

A detained suspect of Chechen origin had contact to a person suspected of having been actively involved in the preparation of a terror attack to be committed by the Islamic State (IS). The responsible public prosecutor's office subsequently instituted an investigation into suspected attempted instigation to commit murder in an unknown number of cases pursuant to section 30 subsection 1 of the German Criminal Code. However, no incident causing any loss or damage occurred. The charge could not be corroborated.

3.7 FIELDS OF CRIME

Compared to the previous year, the year under review 2018 saw a slight downward trend of OC investigations into drug trafficking and smuggling (201 investigations, -2.9 %). Most of the OC groups were still mainly active in this field of crime (37.6 %). In the area of property crime, the number of OC investigations conducted (93, i.e. 17.4 %) remained relatively stable (2017: 94; 2016: 98). Again, these two fields of crime accounted for more than half of all OC investigations reported in 2018 (294 out of 535). Crime associated with the business world followed on rank three again. With a share of 10.3 %, a slight decrease to 55 OC investigations (2017:63) was recorded here. This was followed by facilitation of illegal immigration with 53 OC investigations (2017: 51) and a share of 9.9 %.


The numbers of OC investigations where offenders were found to have used the Internet as an instrument of crime rose by 11.8 % from 34 to 38 OC investigations in 2018. A total of 35.5 % of the OC groups were active in more than one field of crime (2017: 36.4 %). Compared to groups focusing on one specific area of crime only, the groups dedicated to more than one area of crime had a higher average OC potential (44.2 points - 38.5 points). A relevant manifestation of individual OC indicators is not discernible at present.

211 OC investigations yielded leads to money laundering activities (39.4 %; 2017: 212, 37.2 %). Moreover, in 21.7 % of the OC investigations, inquiries were conducted into suspected money laundering pursuant to section 261 of the German Criminal Code (116; 2017: 120, 21.0 %). In addition to investigations solely dealing with money laundering, above all OC investigations concerning drug trafficking and smuggling (40), crime associated with the business world (20) and property crime (16) implied inquiries into suspected money laundering activities pursuant to section 261 of the German Penal Code.



Drug trafficking and smuggling (201 investigations)

The main field of activity of OC in Germany, i.e. drug-related crime, saw a slight decrease by 2.9 %. A total of 201 OC groups (2017: 207) were reported to be active in the field of drug trafficking and smuggling. With 37.5 %, the share of this field of crime in all OC investigations therefore slightly exceeded the level of the previous year (2017: 36.2 %). In the area of drug trafficking and smuggling, more than one third of the OC groups were active in more than one area of crime (33.8 %). In this context, mainly extortion and homicide offences, property crime and arms trafficking and smuggling were identified as secondary activities of these groups. With a good third, OC groups dominated by German nationals continued to prevail in this field of crime (63; 2017: 70, 31.3 %). As in previous years, these were followed by OC groups dominated by Turkish nationals with a slight decrease to 27 OC investigations (13.4 %) in the year under review 2018 (2017: 38, 18.4 %). Mainly cocaine and cannabis products were trafficked and smuggled. Furthermore, the number of OC groups trafficking in synthetic drugs rose by 15.8 % (2018: 22, 2017: 19).



Nationalities dominating drug trafficking and smuggling

Nationality	2018	2017
German	63	70
Turkish	27	38
Albanian	25	18
Lebanese	9	9
Italian	8	11
Dutch	7	3
Serbian	5	5
Greek	4	1
Kosovar	4	4
Russian	4	5
Further nationalities	45	43

Example of a specific case: Import of and trafficking in narcotic drugs

From April 2014, the central criminal inspectorate in Oldenburg, Lower Saxony and the customs authority investigated an OC group dominated by Serbian nationals for suspected illegal import of and illegal trade in significant quantities of narcotic drugs. The group organised cocaine transports from South America to Europe by sea. To plan and hedge their "projects", they attempted to recruit staff from the shipping companies, logistics enterprises and transport companies involved. The repeated recruitments became necessary because the containers used by the group were confiscated several times and the offenders were thus forced to react to the situation. In January 2016 for example, 190 kg of cocaine were detected in Bremerhaven, in the container load of a ship from Ecuador. In addition to organizing the drug transports, individual suspects repeatedly committed burglaries. Since charges were preferred in 2018, a total of six defendants have been sentenced to prison terms between more than one year and six years. The outcome of a separate case involving eight defendants is not yet known.

Brief assessment:

The modus operandi of the perpetrators is an example of the consistent recruitment of accomplices who, due to their employment on the logistics sector, are especially useful to the group. Moreover, it becomes clear how stringently the structures of organised crime react to police measures and remodel their transport routes accordingly.


Property crime (93 investigations)

Despite a decrease by 1.1 %, property crime once again ranked second among the fields of crime (2018: 93, 17.4 %; 2017: 94, 16.4 %).

Motor vehicle property offences remained the most frequently recorded type of property crime (43 OC investigations). They featured a decrease by 8.5 % in 2018 (2017: 47 OC investigations). The OC groups were mainly dominated by Polish (12, 28.0 %) and Lithuanian (9, 21.0 %) nationals.

Altogether 28 groups of perpetrators involved in this field of crime (33.3 %; 2017: 30, 31.9 %) were active in more than one area of crime. As far as the secondary activities of the groups are concerned, counterfeiting and forgery (of vehicle documents) were identified most frequently.

The suppression of theft by breaking and entering also remained a priority of the law enforcement authorities. Compared to the previous year, there was a drop in case numbers. A total of 34 OC investigations concerned thefts by breaking and entering (2017: 38), which corresponds to a 10.5 % decrease. The downward trend (-20.4 %) in domestic burglary cases in the police criminal statistics for 2018 is also reflected by the national situation report on OC. This underlines the efficacy of the action taken against organised burglary over the past years - inter alia by means of the REWO (travelling burglars) project created by the Organised Crime Commission (KOK) and carried out by the Federation and all the Länder. This project aimed at identifying and dismantling groups of perpetrators going on organised domestic burglary trips.



Nationalities dominating property crime

Nationality	2018	2017
Polish	16	11
German	11	9
Lithuanian	9	13
Turkish	9	6
Lebanese	5	4
Dutch	4	2
Georgian	3	3
Kosovar	3	4
Romanian	3	7
Serbian	3	3
unsolved	3	5
Further nationalities	24	27

Crime associated with the business world (55 investigations)


In the field of crime associated with the business world, a total of 55 OC investigations were reported for the year 2018 (10.3 %; 2017: 63, 11.0 %). This is a decrease by 12.7% compared to the previous year. 80.0 % of the groups of offenders focused on a specific area of crime (2017: 69.8 %). The joint commission of the offences lasts 26 months on average and therefore clearly exceeds the average time span of that of all OC groups (20 months). Most of the OC investigations concerned various fraud offences. For example, 20 of these investigations were conducted into suspected fraud by means of call centres. The groups of perpetrators mostly acted to the detriment of elderly people and, inter alia, pretended to be police officers in order to deceive their victims.

Offences associated with the business world were again largely dominated by German nationals, although they were on the decrease (2018: 43.6 %; 2017: 47.6 %). The number of OC investigations directed against groups dominated by Turkish nationals rose once again (19; 2017: 15).

Investigations in the field of crime associated with the business world are usually a time and resource consuming task. They are characterised by the complexity and multidimensional nature of the case facts to be examined.

Nationalities dominating crime associated with the business world

Nationality	2018	2017
German	24	30
Turkish	19	15
Israeli	2	1
Further nationalities	10	17



Facilitation of illegal immigration (53 investigations)

In 2018, the number of OC groups dedicated to facilitation of illegal entry continued to rise, i.e. by 3.9 % to a total of 53 (2017: 51) and thus, the trend observed over the past years continued (2016: 38, 2015: 46, 2014: 35).

The facilitating networks were largely dominated by German, Iraqi, Syrian and Nigerian nationals who mainly smuggled persons from Iraq, the Ukraine, Moldova and Syria. Furthermore, Iran and Nigeria were more frequently identified as countries of origin. In nearly all cases, Germany was the country of destination of the smuggling operations.

Nationalities dominating facilitation of illegal immigration

Nationality	2018	2017
German	12	11
Iraqi	6	3
Syrian	5	8
Nigerian	4	6
Serbian	3	1
Ukrainian	3	2
Afghan	2	2
Azerbaijani	2	2
Iranian	2	1
Macedonian	2	2
Further nationalities	12	13

Example of a specific case: Facilitation of illegal immigration

During a check of a brothel, a prostitute presented forged documents for identification at first. Being initially reluctant, she then stated that she had been taken to Germany from Benin-City via Niger, Libya and Italy. In her home country, she had been promised a free and self-determined life and a job in Germany. Upon her arrival, she was told to work off the transport costs of EUR 60,000, and her passport documents were taken away from her. When interviewed, the prostitute gave the impression of being under the influence of "Voodoo oaths". She was committed to a care facility for protection.

Based on the interview results, numerous telephone lines were wiretapped. This helped to identify the people behind the scenes, the smuggling routes and further victims. In early 2018, three arrest warrants and 13 search warrants were executed in flats and three large brothels. 18 further persons including seven prostitutes were arrested for suspected illegal stay. In the course of the investigations, six further prostitutes were identified. As a result of the intense and elaborate police care as well as the targeted placement of victims with specialized female victim lawyers, the prostitutes slowly built trust in government institutions. In early March 2018, the spiritual leader of Benin City lifted all so-called "Voodoo oaths" of more than 100 priests and natural healers. At the same time, he cursed all Juju priests who would perform this ritual on victims on behalf of perpetrators in the future. According to expert estimates, this is a historical development which weakened the Juju oath as a means of coercion after it had been applied for decades. Meanwhile, court proceedings have been opened and the trial is still in progress.

Brief assessment:


The case illustrates that women are still lured to Germany with false promises and by means of "Voodoo oaths" in order to make them work as prostitutes. The investigations led to the dismantling of the human trafficker ring and the identification of further operating female pimps from Nigeria (so-called Madams). It is also noteworthy that the "Voodoo oaths" were lifted by a spiritual leader.

Tax and customs offences (39 investigations)

The downward trend in the number of investigations into tax and customs offences continued during the year under review when a total of 39 investigations (2017: 48, 2016: 57) were conducted. With a percentage of 7.3 % (2017: 8.4 %), this field of crime continues to rank fifth. In this field of crime, 89.7 % of the OC groups focused on one specific area of crime (2017: 77.1 %). With 38.6 %, cigarette smuggling was once again the main activity of OC groups dedicated to tax and customs crime. Furthermore, 15.9 % of the OC investigations within this area were conducted into smuggling of other dutiable commodities.

Nationalities dominating tax and customs offences

Nationality	2018	2017
German	15	20
Turkish	5	4
Chinese	3	1
Polish	3	7
British	2	3
Iranian	2	2
Lithuanian	2	--
Russian	2	1
Further nationalities	5	10




Violent crime (25 investigations)

The number of OC investigations concerning violent crime dropped by 24.2 % to a total of 25 OC investigations (2017:33). More than half of the groups involved were active in more than one area of crime (56.0 %). For the most part, the groups were under investigation for extortion and robbery as well as offences against life. In 20 OC investigations (80.0 %), the suspects were found to be armed (2017: 72.7 %). In addition, ten (40.0 %) of the OC investigations reported in this field of crime revealed links to outlaw motorcycle groups or OMCG-type groups (2017: 60.6 %).

Nationalities dominating violent crime

Nationality	2018	2017
German	8	10
Turkish	5	6
Lithuanian	4	4
Russian	3	5
Polish	2	1
Armenian	1	1
Serbian	1	2
Stateless	1	--



Crime associated with nightlife (16 investigations)

The number of OC investigations concerning crime associated with nightlife saw a significant decrease by 38.5 % to 16 groups (2017: 26). 50 % of the OC investigations were conducted into human trafficking for sexual exploitation and the other half into exploitation of prostitutes or forced prostitution.

Nationalities dominating crime associated with nightlife

Nationality	2018	2017
Nigerian	5	4
Bulgarian	4	8
Hungarian	3	3
Chinese	1	--
German	1	4
Ghanaian	1	--
Romanian	1	3




Cybercrime (13 investigations)

The number of cybercrime OC investigations dropped by 23.5 % to 13 (2017: 17). Most Cyber-OC groups were dominated by nationals from the Ukraine. The groups mainly committed digital extortions (38.5 %) and attacks on online banking (23.1 %). Current technology trends open up new opportunities for crime and are likely to aggravate the threat situation even further. Besides, more and more perpetrators without specific expertise are thus enabled to acquire the know-how required for committing such offences and for buying relevant tools. The supposed anonymity offered by the dark web makes this part of the internet especially attractive for perpetrators. In general, cybercriminals have been found to act on the basis of a division of tasks.

Nationalities dominating cybercrime

Nationality	2018	2017
Ukrainian	4	4
German	2	1
Russian	2	5
unsolved	2	3
Beninese	1	1
Cameroonian	1	1
Moldovan	1	1




Counterfeiting/forgery (17 investigations)

In the field of counterfeiting/ forgery, the number of OC investigations has remained constant (2017: also 17). In addition to identity documents and driving licences, cash (false Euro), payment cards and employment contracts were forged/ counterfeited. During the year under review 2018, the OC groups were mainly dominated by German and Kosovar nationals, so that the development of 2017 continued.

Nationalities dominating counterfeiting/forgery

Nationality	2018	2017
German	4	3
Kosovar	4	3
Bulgarian	3	2
Turkish	3	3
Iranian	1	1
Italian	1	--
Syrian	1	1



Example of a specific case: Trade in counterfeits and insurance fraud

In Bavaria, a German group of perpetrators centred around a lawyer's office was investigated. In several German "Länder", the owner of the law office employed so-called "legal assistants" who were primarily dedicated to finding persons interested in obtaining a driving license in a quick and easy way. For this purpose, a "driving license without MPU" (medical psychological examination) was advertised on the Internet. The counterfeit Hungarian driving licenses, offered for EUR 3,000, were procured by a Hungarian contact. Based on an international arrest warrant, the latter was arrested in Hungary and surrendered to Germany. Extensive inquiries led to the identification of far more than 100 persons who had purchased the counterfeit licenses.

As a further line of business, the groups of perpetrators fabricate traffic accidents with fraudulent intent. A "legal assistant" recruited persons by promising them remuneration if they served either as a driver or a purported vehicle keeper during the acts constituting the offences. The alleged losses were confirmed by different experts involved in the criminal group, and the lawyer then pushed through the claims with various insurance companies.

Brief assessment:

The case illustrates how a heterogeneously structured group with various skills and contacts, also abroad, successfully set up and ran different lucrative business models by relying on the logistics of third parties and their own. The fact that the activity was supported by a lawyer's office aroused the impression of respectability.

Money laundering (8 investigations)

The field of money laundering saw a slight decrease to a total of eight OC investigations in 2018 (2017: 9). OC groups active in the field of money laundering were again dominated by German nationals, followed by Italian nationals.



Criminal association (7 investigations)

Through the amendment of section 129 of the German Criminal Code in 2017, its scope of application has been expanded. While investigations were conducted against one OC group for "formation of a criminal organization" pursuant to section 129 of the German Criminal Code (new) in 2017, a total of seven such OC groups were recorded in 2018. Three of these OC groups were dominated by Italian nationals.



Example of a specific case: Criminal association (clan crime)

In September 2018, officers from Bremen, Hamburg, Lower Saxony and the customs authorities searched a total of 18 properties in Bremen and Lower Saxony under the direction of Bremen public prosecutor's office. Prior to that, extensive investigations had been conducted since December 2017 against a German/Turkish group of offenders for suspected formation of a criminal organization, gang-type fraud on a commercial basis, suspected money laundering and other offences.

The group of offenders operated from a call centre in Turkey using various phone numbers for contacting fraud victims in Germany. The offenders pretended to the victims, most of whom were elderly, that they were police officers and by claiming in each case that their assets were in danger, they prompted the victims to hand out assets to collectors.

The investigations revealed the ruthlessness and scrupulousness with which the persons charged, driven by a rampant greed for profit, intended to ruin or at least jeopardize the livelihood of elderly helpless persons, who, in a first step, were made to fear for their savings. With the proceeds stemming from the call centre fraud scheme, the prime suspect founded a network of companies in order to commit further frauds. In some of the companies, so-called front men were used as managing directors.

Asset recovery measures led to the seizure of more than two million Euro.

Brief assessment:

The example of the call centre fraud case illustrates the high degree of organization and international networking of a criminal organization. In order to gain access to the savings of their victims, the offenders often act ruthlessly and exert enormous pressure on them. In this way, the criminal organizations, who frequently operate from Turkish call centres, manage to lay hands on assets in the million range. Sometimes, leading members of these groups are spotted in Germany and links to clan crime are proved.

Arms trafficking and smuggling (4 investigations)

The number of OC groups involved in arms trafficking and smuggling rose to four in 2018 (2017: 3). The OC investigations concerned illegal trade in war weapons, firearms and ammunition. German and Dutch nationals had leading positions in these OC groups.



Corruption (3 investigations)

In 2018, three OC investigations were conducted into suspected corruption (2017: 2). All OC groups were dominated by German nationals. These cases concerned, inter alia, bribery on the health sector as well as illicit collusions in connection with the placement of sponsoring contracts.



Environmental crime (1 investigation)

In the field of environmental crime, one OC investigation was reported (2017: 1). This OC investigation was conducted for suspected illegal manufacture and distribution of food products and pharmaceuticals. The OC group was dominated by German nationals.



4 International Aspects of Organized Crime



In 2018, 418 OC investigations (2017: 455) with international links were reported. Links of OC groups in Germany to a total of 128 different countries (2017: 128) were identified. These figures prove the international nature of organised crime.

There were 170 OC investigations revealing links to the Netherlands, far more than to any other country. Most of these OC investigations were conducted into suspected drug trafficking and smuggling. Once again, this proves the unchanged significance of the Netherlands as a country of origin and transit for drug deliveries to Germany and the status of the Netherlands as an important base of internationally operating OC groups predominantly engaged in the field of drug trafficking.

The large number of OC investigations having an international dimension requires close cooperation with police authorities in other European countries. International cooperation in police matters is continuously improved by numerous bi- and multilateral agreements, the initiation of parallel investigative proceedings, the creation of Joint Investigation Teams () and the close contact of the BKA liaison officers to the national security agencies abroad. For example, the police forces of the Länder and of the Bundeskriminalamt initiated a Task Force with the Albanian police. It is mainly dedicated to the suppression of organised drug crime. Under the leadership of a certain Land, there is, moreover, a close cooperation with Poland and other countries regarding the suppression of international cargo theft. In an OC investigation conducted in the field of economic crime (financial crime), the BKA closely cooperated with Israeli authorities and Europol.

As an initial step to fight the greatest criminal threats to the European Union in the field of serious and organised Crime, the EU adopted the EU Policy Cycle. The basis of the EU Policy Cycle is the "European Union Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment" (SOCTA), which is drawn up every four years. The SOCTA is an analysis of current and future threats which, in the assessment of Europol, emanate from serious and organised crime. The report expresses recommendations for setting priorities in crime control. Furthermore, coordination and cooperation in the prioritised fields of crime are to be optimised within the four-year cycle.

As part of the SOCTA 2017 prioritization, Europol verified the priorities defined for the area of Serious and Organised Crime. The EU members countries were to be queried with a view to finding out whether their priorities had changed in any way. The BKA made contributions regarding those fields of serious and organised crime which had featured new or relevant developments in 2017.

5 Overall Assessment

General observations on the OC situation 2018

Compared to 2017, the number of OC investigations has dropped but the threat posed by organised crime is invariably strong. As in previous years, the identified OC groups were active in all fields of crime and above all in drug trafficking and smuggling. Despite the partially decreasing number of cases, the nationwide reports of investigations relating to property crime, crime associated with the business world, facilitation of illegal immigration and tax and customs offences represented further key issues. The areas of violent crime, counterfeiting/forgery, crime associated with nightlife and cybercrime saw partially declining activities of OC groups; nevertheless, these forms of crime are still intensely dealt with as part of the fight against organised crime.

As in previous years, the offences were committed internationally or there was a cooperation with OC groups from abroad in roughly 80 % of the OC investigations conducted in Germany. Once again, this emphasises the absolute necessity of a close cooperation with foreign security authorities and Europol in the fight against OC.

The traditional key areas of organised crime, i.e. IOC, REOC and OMCG crime, continue to be in the focus of the German police authorities. As for IOC, the relatively low total number of OC investigations reported was reconfirmed in 2018. However, we must assume that a significant number of such crimes go unreported. Members of IOC use Germany for example as a space for escape or retreat, as a safe haven and as a place for investment. Their methods and behaviour are oriented accordingly, which reduces the risk of being detected by the security agencies or law enforcement authorities.

The Internet with all its possibilities of encrypted communication has become an instrument of crime meanwhile used by numerous criminal groups. This trend, too, was not stopped during the period under review. The dark web, a sealed-off part of the Internet, which offers anonymity to a great extent, facilitates the uncomplicated purchase of incriminated products. In addition to classical commodities such as drugs, weapons or counterfeit currency, these increasingly include illicit services which also offer an opportunity to amateurs to commit offences in the area of cybercrime.

For the year under review 2018, the phenomenon of clan crime in the context of OC, the impact of migrants on OC in Germany and suspected links of OC groups to terrorism/politically motivated crime (PMC) were examined for the first time.

Criminal members of ethnically secluded subcultures (clan crime)

To classify OC groups associated with clan crime, classification criteria and indicators for data collection were developed and adopted by the Federation and the Länder for the first time in relation to the year under review 2018.

Therefore, it has been possible for the first time to depict this specific crime phenomenon, substantiated by a valid data basis, in the National Situation Report on Organised Crime.

This issue is a priority of OC suppression in Germany, and the German security authorities will have to deal with it even more thoroughly in the future.

Involvement of suspected migrants in organised crime

In the year under review 2018, migrants were reported for the first time as suspects in OC investigations. In view of the total number of OC suspects, the migrants suspected of OC only represent a minor percentage.

Nevertheless, we need to continue to observe the meanwhile known impact of migration on OC and to prevent the formation of new OC structures as well as the consolidation of those established already.

Suspected links of OC groups to terrorism/politically motivated crime (/PMC)

In this context, only isolated person-related links of OC suspects to the area of /PMC have been identified. Structural links of OC groups to /PMC have not been detected in the overall picture.






However, the police will have to keep an eye on this issue so as to be able to recognize any still concealed or future structural link.

Prioritisation process of the Organised Crime Commission






As a result of the prioritisation process of the Organised Crime Commission, current and potential future focal points are continuously identified as part of a structured collection of information from the police forces of the Federation and the Länder as well as the customs authorities, and goal-oriented agreements are concluded on project-related cross-Länder cooperation whenever necessary.

Annex






Groups dominated by German nationals (150)








Groups dominated by Turkish nationals (71)








Groups dominated by Albanian nationals (26)








Groups dominated by Polish nationals (23)








Groups dominated by Lithuanian nationals (18)








Groups dominated by Italian nationals (16)







Groups dominated by Lebanese nationals (14)








Groups dominated by Russian nationals (13)








Groups dominated by Kosovar nationals (12)



Groups dominated by Dutch nationals (12)



Groups dominated by Serbian nationals (12)



Alphabetical overview of all nationalities identified

Country	Dom. Grp.	Suspects	New Suspects
Afghanistan	4	39	20
Egypt	1	5	5
Albania	26	244	105
Algeria	1	7	4
Argentina	0	2	0
Armenia	5	39	6
Azerbaijan	4	26	9
Australia	0	3	3
Bangladesh	0	2	1
Belgium	0	12	4
Benin	2	10	9
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3	33	11
Brazil	0	3	2
Bulgaria	11	196	38
China	4	12	12
Denmark	0	6	1
Germany	150	2023	963
Dominican Republic	0	1	1
Ivory Coast	0	2	2
Ecuador	0	1	0
Eritrea	0	1	1
Estonia	0	11	2
Finland	0	3	0
France	2	28	14
Georgia	4	34	10
Ghana	2	5	5
Greece	5	56	21
United Kingdom	2	92	7
Guatemala	0	2	2
Guinea	0	2	2
Guinea-Bissau	1	1	1
Guyana	0	1	1

Country	Dom. Grp.	Suspects	New Suspects
India	0	5	3
Iraq	10	87	56
Iran	8	45	22
Israel	2	12	6
Italy	16	210	105
Jamaica	0	1	0
Jordan	1	5	3
Cameroon	2	23	13
Canada	1	5	0
Kazakhstan	0	14	9
Colombia	3	18	5
Democratic Republic of Congo	0	7	7
Kosovo	12	182	30
Croatia	3	26	18
Latvia	2	23	11
Lebanon	14	178	78
Libya	1	11	4
Lithuania	18	146	61
Luxembourg	0	1	0
Morocco	2	27	20
Macedonia	5	39	18
Mexico	0	4	1
Republic of Moldova	5	56	27
Montenegro	1	13	3
Nepal	1	11	10
The Netherlands	12	133	84
Nigeria	11	62	13
Austria	2	21	6
Pakistan	2	9	6
Peru	0	2	1
Poland	23	404	255
Portugal	0	5	3
Romania	6	179	64
Russian Federation	13	116	59
Sweden	0	5	1
Switzerland	1	12	2

State	Dom. Grp.	Suspects	New Suspects
Serbia	12	120	64
Singapore	1	1	0
Slovak Republic	1	6	0
Slovenia	1	7	7
Somalia	0	1	0
Spain	2	39	19
Sri Lanka	0	1	1
Suriname	0	2	1
Syria	10	135	61
Thailand	1	23	2
Togo	0	1	1
Czech Republic	1	43	3
Tunisia	0	6	3
Turkey	71	714	400
Ukraine	10	112	62
Hungary	3	20	13
USA	0	19	2
Uzbekistan	0	1	0
Venezuela	0	1	1
United Arab Emirates	0	3	2
Vietnam	6	45	17
Belarus	1	10	8
Not stated	0	1	0
Other European countries	0	2	0
Stateless	2	11	6
Unsolved	9	160	59
Overall results	535	6,483	2,998

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